



















© 2017 Tarah Foster Williams 
 
					
THE FRAGILITY OF TOLERANCE:  



















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
in the Graduate College of the 










 Professor Jeffery J. Mondak, Chair 
 Professor James H. Kuklinski 
 Professor Damarys J. Canache 









 Tolerating difference is politically consequential.  If a society is intolerant, political and 
social minorities can be subject to consequences ranging from ridicule to the denial of civil 
liberties to violence.  Because of these high stakes, this dissertation argues that tolerance requires 
more than “putting up with” disliked groups; it quite often requires active support for their rights. 
This active understanding of tolerance is at odds with the discipline’s typical passive 
understanding of tolerance. Although much is known about tolerance attitudes, relatively little is 
known about when people will act on these attitudes in the real world. This dissertation 
highlights factors that can impede or facilitate tolerant actions.  For instance, when individuals 
must act on their tolerance, it is in a social context where they may perceive pressure from others 
in their networks and in their communities. Thus, the dissertation investigates whether and when 
individuals are willing to speak up on behalf of tolerance.  
 I leverage a series of unique survey experiments that draw on theories from social 
psychology, political science and communication to demonstrate how social pressure not only 
alters the expression of politically tolerant beliefs, but also the transformation of these beliefs 
into behaviors.  My empirical chapters find that individuals are unwilling to speak out against 
intolerance towards a variety of minority groups, including political groups, racial minorities, 
LGBT people, and the disabled. Furthermore, the more public or socially costly the action, the 
less willing individuals are to stand up for tolerance. Despite holding tolerant attitudes, I 
demonstrate that individuals are unprepared to voice their convictions or explain them to others. 
The reticence of allies to speak up for tolerance highlights a vexing problem for minority 
communities and pluralist democracies alike. However, my work also emphasizes characteristics 
that make some individuals resistant to social pressure and able to help change prevailing social 
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dynamics. I argue that to create a tolerant society, silence in the face of intolerance is the most 
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WHAT’S THE POINT OF TOLERANCE? 
 
 
 One of the values we hold most dear in liberal democracies is freedom of speech and 
expression. For this reason, it is important that individuals understand these rights and freedoms, 
that they are politically tolerant. Tolerating difference, at its core, allows us to peacefully coexist 
with one another. Without tolerance, groups could be stripped of their freedoms and conflict 
between groups could erupt more often. Frequently, we think of tolerance as “putting up with” a 
disliked group. This understanding suggests a very passive notion of tolerance.  It suggests that 
tolerant attitudes are sufficient to preserve tolerance.  Even if we strongly disagree with what 
another person expresses, we “put up” with expression—we do not intervene or suppress their 
speech. Our measures of tolerance often suggest this sort of passive orientation (Sullivan, 
Pierson and Marcus 1979). However, live and let live may be an insufficient philosophy to 
preserve tolerance.  
 I argue that creating a tolerant society requires something beyond passivity. If all people 
held tolerant attitudes, then passive tolerance would be enough. We would not have to publicly 
act on our tolerance.  But so long as intolerance survives, we need people willing to do more than 
passively hold an attitude. We need people willing to act.   
 If there was no intolerance, we would never witness intergroup tension or threat, but we 
do (Kinder and Kam 2010; Hopkins 2010). Scholarship has demonstrated not only that 
intolerance seems to survive in the populace, but also that tolerance attitudes are quite varied and 
pliable (for a review, see Sullivan and Transue 1999 and Gibson 2013). For this reason, 
democratic societies confront situations where intolerant majorities could trample on the rights of 
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minorities, or the less powerful. This suggests that we need a more active vision of tolerance.  
But that, of course, comes with an additional set of problems. 
 When we are challenged to uphold tolerance it is not in a room with an objective survey 
researcher, it is in the social world. If those who are tolerant are also passive (merely “putting up 
with” a disliked other), it may provide the intolerant with the ability to capture the room. In this 
situation, intolerance may have a clear advantage. Intolerant people may be most willing to speak 
up and most convinced of their own rightness (Watt and Larkin 2010). For this reason we must 
examine the individuals who are willing to not only hold a tolerant opinion, but also openly 
express it among divergent others. We must look at the conditions under which the tolerant and 
intolerant will speak or stay silent.  
 Scholars have voiced similar concerns before. None have put it more eloquently than 
Barry Schwartz, who argues that tolerance requires more of citizens: 
 “Why on earth, in the name of tolerance, should we feel an obligation not just to restrain 
ourselves from interfering with a practice of which we disapprove, but to act in a way 
that facilitates it? The answer is based not on principles but on practicality. In a world of 
dramatically unequal power and control of material resources, doing nothing to get in the 
way is no better than putting up with; it is simply not good enough. Groups that lack 
resources will not be able to sustain themselves and their practices without our help. … 
The commitment to tolerate less powerful groups requires active support, not passive 
putting up with. Is it really possible for anyone actually to do this? I don’t know. What I 
do know is that in a world of unequal power, claims of tolerance on the part of the 
powerful who do nothing to assist the powerless whom they tolerate have a distinctly 
disingenuous ring - so much so that the claims may themselves be intolerable.” (Schwartz 
1996, p. 28) 
 
Schwartz’s answer to his own question, “I don’t know”, suggests we do not possess much 
evidence to tell us whether people are willing to take a stand for tolerance. The importance of his 
claim is clear, though. To ensure a tolerant society, a society that lives up to democratic and 
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pluralist ideals, it is essential that there are active supporters of tolerance, not simply those who 
would choose not to interfere. 
 
When values collide: the paradox of tolerance 
 Being actively politically tolerant, however, poses a great challenge. Tolerance is one of 
the many domains in which citizens may feel cross-pressured by commitments to multiple values 
at once. When members of a group like the KKK or Westboro Baptist Church seeks to exercise 
their political rights by expressing hate speech, citizens are often torn between two sets of 
values—political tolerance and social tolerance.  On the one hand, citizens want to hold firm to 
their abstract belief in freedom of speech, they want to maintain political tolerance.  On the other 
hand, they may feel pulled to take a stance against hate speech.  Understandably, citizens may 
feel that standing up for the rights of the WBC or the KKK means that they are tacitly endorsing 
social intolerance. This challenge is often discussed as the paradox of tolerance (Mendus 1989; 
Heyd 1996; Williams 2000).  
 This value conflict is likely to arise frequently as modern democratic citizens are 
socialized to place high premiums on both social tolerance and political tolerance.  This very 
tendency seems to undergird the growth of selective intolerance against racists on college 
campuses in the United States (Chong 2006).  In fact, one major challenge facing democracies is 
whether and how to reconcile these values. Other nation states have reacted to this conflict by 
placing limits on freedom of speech. In many Western European democracies and Canada, 
statutes have been created to contend with hate speech (Bleich 2011). Scholars in these contexts 
have even developed alternate notions of tolerance that allow for an understanding of these 
limits.  For instance, Harell’s concept of “multicultural tolerance” rejects the idea of absolute 
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tolerance and argues that one can be tolerant and still embrace speech exceptions for speech that 
undermines the broader goals and challenges of a multicultural society (Harell 2010).  
 The United States has a history of rejecting legal restrictions against hate speech and 
preserving speech rights whenever possible (Boyle 2001).1  Therefore, the adoption of legal 
solutions in the United States seems unlikely despite the urging of some legal scholars (Matsuda 
1989; Delgado and Stefancic 1997; Waldron 2012). But for those who prioritize free speech, 
these solutions are also undesirable.  Although developing laws and free speech limitations may 
provide one solution to the conflict between hate speech and free speech, there are many 
arguments against these codified limits on free speech. Some have argued that such restrictions 
undermine democratic values, while others worry that speech restrictions are ineffective at 
eliminating the hateful attitudes that may underlie hate speech (Baker 2009; Gelber 2002).  
 Without legal power to stop hateful speech, we may sometimes feel like we must be 
complacent in the face of speech.  In this way, we can take the notion of free speech too far—
assuming freedom of speech means we, as individuals, cannot actively oppose speech or 
assuming that all views are intrinsically worthy of equal respect. We may fall prey to turning 
tolerance into toleration. If speech is offensive, we might believe it is better for us to simply plug 
our ears and hold our noses rather than to challenge speech. This, however, leaves individuals 
with little agency to preserve social tolerance in the face of intolerant speech. But unfettered free 
speech does not mean sitting idly by while others exercise their rights.  Instead, if we consider 
the broader goals of tolerance and speech, we must recognize that we have further obligations 
than permitting speech. We have a democratic obligation to respond. 
 																																																								
1 However, the United States has been focused on limiting discrimination and hate crimes more than some 
other nations (Bleich 2011). 
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Why Respond? The Origins of Tolerance 
 Considering both classical liberal theory and more recent legal scholarship on the topic, 
there seems to be a consensus that response is the best way to combat offensive speech and ideas. 
A careful reading of liberal democratic theory suggests why engaging with speech is essential. 
On Liberty by John Stuart Mill is often cited as the crucial justification for freedom of thought 
and expression.  Indeed, Mill greatly valued free expression. But for Mill, free expression was a 
means to an end.  Expressing opinions was not beneficial in and of itself, instead expressing 
opinions was a useful instrument to help us assess and understand truth and to develop our own 
capacity for thought.  Certainly, it was not his contention that all speech is equally correct or 
valid.  Instead, he believed that the value of freedom of speech was in the potential for error and 
truth to conflict, allowing us greater appreciation for truth and reason.  
 Mill’s idea later became understood as supporting a marketplace of ideas where a diverse 
array of ideas is presented and the best idea wins out.  The marketplace of ideas model has 
played an important role in the application of the First Amendment.  For instance, Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis wrote in a dissenting opinion in 1919: “[T]he ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas…[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market” (Abrams v. United States). Competition, then, is 
key. We cannot simply allow erroneous ideas into public debates, we must also offer other better 
ideas to counter them.  
 For the marketplace of ideas to fulfill its purpose, different voices must be heard and 
individuals must be willing to debate even controversial ideas. This poses a particular challenge 
when talking about group rights. Although most may have an opinion, not all will voice their 
opinions, compromising the chance of the best idea winning out. Minority groups, in particular, 
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may have limited influence on such questions and those who side with the minority group may 
remain silent as well. We may censor ourselves because it seems easier, or because we would 
prefer not to ruffle feathers. This tendency, then, to bow to real or imagined social pressure may 
leave minority rights at a greater disadvantage if allies are unwilling to speak up. 
 This suggests, then, that it is not enough for individuals to voice their opinions; the key to 
free speech’s utility is in social dialogue and discussion. Mill lauds our capacity to correct our 
errors in this way: 
“He is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by 
experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. 
Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and 
arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it” (p. 23). 
 
Often, in public discourse, freedom of speech is perverted to an anti-social picture of freedom of 
expression, suggesting that when an offensive group expresses their views others must politely 
sit down and shut up so as not to infringe on these rights.  But as the quote above highlights, 
conversation is key. For this reason, a tolerant society cannot entail letting others speak while we 
plug our ears or look away. We must do more than merely admit offensive groups to participate, 
we must engage with them. This requires us to overcome social pressure to stand up for 
tolerance. 
 John Dewey echoed these sentiments nearly a century later—suggesting that society 
benefits from a certain kind of discussion and is wise to prevent hate from festering. “Merely 
legal guarantees of the civil liberties of free belief, free expression, free assembly are of little 
avail if in daily life freedom of communication, the give and take of ideas, facts, experiences is 
choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred” (Dewey, “Creative Democracy”). 
 More recent scholarship on the application of the First Amendment and the historical 
development of free speech rights concur with this strategy.  First Amendment scholar C. Edwin 
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Baker was one of the strongest advocates of free speech.  Yet he, too, championed the idea of 
response to speech. “[T]o the extent they are able, people should reject, not tolerate, evil 
counsels and evil endeavors. Specifically, people should condemn the racist expression and react 
accordingly to the people who purvey it” (Baker 2009, p. 15). Other scholars have echoed the 
call for more speech in the face of offensive speech (Butler 1997; Gelber 2002). The preferred 
way for us to intervene—to stop hate speech and combat prejudicial attitudes—should be to 
confront prejudice with reason. 
 Ultimately, then, while we must let all enter the public sphere and speak, we must also 
remain vigilant to ensure that both sides can confront each other.  Mill contends that even when 
information becomes accepted as truth, we must continue to voice arguments for it, lest it be 
accepted as dogma rather than understood as truth (Mill 1989, p. 39).  
 All of this suggests that a great deal of responsibility rests with the citizen. The first key 
to preserving freedom of speech is to allow even offensive groups to enter the public sphere and 
voice their views.  However, this does not require us to be deferential once they have entered.  In 
fact, for freedom of speech to achieve anything useful, it does require us to speak up when we 
disagree with beliefs. Although we must be willing to let groups with offensive views into the 
public sphere, we must also be willing to publicly challenge these views and to tell those who 
hold them why they are repugnant. 
 To defend political and social tolerance, then, citizens must develop the right kind of 
habits.  Citizens need to simultaneously understand why groups must be allowed into the public 
square and be willing to challenge their assertions. So, although there may seem to be a tension 
between social and political tolerance, in reality the tension simply signals that we need to 
prioritize each form of tolerance at different junctures. Social pressure can silence us at precisely 
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these moments when we need to stand strong and go to bat for tolerance. Assuming, however, 
that an offensive group does speak or that hate speech enters into public discourse, we may find 
it easier to look the other way rather than to engage in a social discussion or confrontation. 
Overcoming social pressure in these situations can help citizens meet their democratic potential.  
 
An Obligation to Speak Up: Are we up to the task? 
 Despite nearly two centuries worth of calls for combating speech with speech, little has 
been done to directly investigate whether citizens are up to this challenge. Preserving tolerance 
requires tolerant behavior—and, more precisely, a vocal citizenry—one which understands 
tolerance but also, just as importantly, one that is willing to speak up when a group’s rights are 
threatened. Having brought into view this important but overlooked means of preserving 
tolerance, I ask whether we are prepared to both advocate for freedom of expression and to speak 
up in the face of intolerance.  
 Why do we know so little about who is willing to stand up for tolerance? Partially, this is 
because previous studies of tolerance have focused heavily or exclusively on who holds tolerant 
attitudes and why. This focus on tolerant attitudes has yielded important insights but has also 
focused our attention too narrowly. While we certainly want to know who holds tolerant attitudes 
and why, we also need to know when tolerant attitudes translate into tolerant actions.   
 In fact, our interest in tolerant behavior has motivated the study of tolerance attitudes. 
Bollinger writes: 
“[w]e might say that when we deal with speech acts, we are dealing with the mind behind 
the act, or revealed through the act, but to say that is to begin to recognize that we are 
virtually always concerned with the mind as manifested through behavior, whether it be 
speech or nonspeech behavior…Stated another way, it need not be the exclusive function 
of free speech to protect an activity (speech) that is especially prized, but rather to work 
toward the correction of a perceived general defect in our intellectual makeup, one that 
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happens to manifest itself sometimes in our reactions toward speech acts” (Bollinger 
1986, p. 119-120). 
 
However, although holding an attitude and acting are fundamentally different things, they are 
often conflated when we consider questions of political tolerance. In much of the literature, the 
willingness of individuals to act on their tolerance judgments (or even voice their opinions 
outside the survey) is either assumed or overlooked. The vast majority of tolerance studies use 
survey questions that assess individuals’ levels of tolerance and then take these assessments at 
face value, as meaningful. Tolerance judgments are thought to say a great deal about the 
potential for threats to political freedoms.  
 I argue the political tolerance literature has largely overlooked the political reality and 
behavioral consequences of political tolerance. Scholars have rarely considered the way social 
considerations should and do shape tolerant behavior. I argue that acting on political tolerance 
judgments is frequently a social phenomenon. At very least, publicly holding a position on a 
tolerance issue has social ramifications. In social contexts, people are neither asked to assert their 
tolerance attitudes in a vacuum nor to hold onto them in isolation from others, like they are in 
surveys. Nor are the contemporary considerations studied in the literature (like threat perception 
and framing) raised in the abstract, instead they are brought to bear by people, often in social 
interactions.  
 The tolerance literature has not entirely ignored behavior, however. Unfortunately, when 
these few studies have addressed behavior, they have yielded conflicting results.  Most notably, 
Gibson’s work has focused on various groups and individuals involved in actual tolerance 
dilemmas (see Gibson and Bingham 1985 and Gibson and Gouws 2003, for examples). The 
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insights he and his co-authors provided are invaluable, but this work concentrates on relatively 
narrow cases, and often activist populations (Gibson and Bingham 1985).  
 Apart from Gibson, other scholars have studied behavioral intentions and contributed 
important lessons but provided somewhat conflicting results. For instance, LaPiere (1934) asked 
restaurant and hotel owners whether they would deny service to Chinese Americans. Then, he 
travelled with a Chinese American couple to these establishments. Many restaurant owners 
stated unequivocally that they would refuse service to diners, but in practice when the researcher 
returned with Chinese American confederates, they were never turned away from a restaurant 
(1934).  
 On the other hand, Marcus et al. (1995) incorporated behavioral intention questions and 
asked individuals whether they would be willing to act on their tolerance or intolerance. The 
authors found that the intolerant were much more likely to say they would act on a variety of 
behavioral intention measures. The tolerant respondents were much less likely to say that they 
would act. This corresponds to other research suggesting that while intolerance is a strong 
attitude, tolerance is weak (Gibson and Gouws 2003). While this important contribution sheds 
light on what average (non-activist) individuals might do in a situation, what their behavioral 
intention measure leaves out is the social considerations that individuals weigh when making 
decisions about whether and how to voice their attitudes. 
 
Translating attitudes into behavior: the importance of social influence 
 Apart from the strict focus on tolerance attitudes rather than behavior, I argue that one of 
the reasons we do not know whether people would be willing to take a stand for minority rights 
is that we have not often considered the way social pressure might uniquely influence this type of 
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behavior. Providing social help to another may pose a social cost to the helper. This social cost 
then changes the way our attitudes lead to behavior and potentially inhibit us from acting on our 
beliefs. When it comes to minority rights, there has been an insufficient amount of attention 
devoted to what differentiates our attitudes from our behaviors.  
 Scholars are well aware that holding an attitude is not the same as expressing an attitude. 
Research about implicit attitudes, voting behavior and social conformity confirms this 
distinction. From the early Asch (1955) experiments to more recent work (Visser and Mirabile 
2004; Levitan and Visser 2008; Verhulst and Levitan 2009), research has consistently shown that 
social pressure leads individuals to moderate the attitudes they expressed in more private 
settings. Not only that, but they tend to adjust their private attitudes into the future to more 
closely align with what they said in a group setting. At times, conformity could be 
inconsequential—if groups will not ultimately play any role in a decision—or even beneficial—
if social conformity can facilitate agreement and decision-making more swiftly. At other times, 
however, when the question is very important or there is a strong reason to hold the line, social 
pressure might be what leads us down the path to majority tyranny, trampling on the status 
and/or rights of minority populations. 
 As I conceptualize tolerance here, standing up for the equitable status and political rights 
of others means expressing either social tolerance or political tolerance. A tolerant society 
requires both social tolerance and political tolerance. Social tolerance allows minority groups to 
be free from discrimination or harm. Those who are socially tolerant do not necessarily approve 
of all groups, but they agree that groups should not be mistreated in communities. Social 
tolerance is often studied in political science by looking at prejudice and shifting social attitudes. 
Political tolerance is the willingness to extend political rights (like freedom of expression) to 
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others with whom one disagrees. Studies of political tolerance often ask individuals to identify a 
“least-liked group” and choose whether they would extend to this group certain fundamental 
political rights (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1979). Although these concepts are different in 
their implications and their operationalization, both forms of tolerance are challenging to act on 
in the social world. Both forms of tolerance are about the preservation of minority group rights. 
Although we may hold the principles of social and political tolerance deeply, we may not be 
prepared to face social ostracism, or merely discomfort, for acting on them.  
 Social tolerance and political tolerance have typically not been the targets of the same 
studies (see Schafer and Shaw 2009; Golebiowska 2014, for notable exceptions, and Sullivan, 
Piereson, and Marcus (1982) include a brief treatment of social tolerance). This distinction has 
been justified on the grounds that the two concepts bear little empirical similarity. The 
individuals who are politically intolerant are not related to those who are socially intolerant (for a 
review, see Gibson 2006). Although these two concepts may be disparate, I expect similar social 
forces to matter for both. Both social tolerance and political tolerance are contentious concepts 
and both have foundations in personal, political, and democratic values. When challenges to 
either social or political tolerance arise, standing up to a crowd may prove especially daunting. 
Therefore, I expect to see similar processes leading to or dampening the expression of political 
and social tolerance. However, keeping in mind the conceptual and empirical distinction listed 
above, I expect these social forces will weigh on different individuals in cases of social versus 
political tolerance. 
 
Organization of the dissertation 
 Chapter 2 revisits the normative case for why individuals must stand up for tolerance and 
then turns to the factors underlying the choice to stand up or remain silent. The chapter explains 
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why there may be a disconnect between attitudes and behavior. I argue that expectations about 
the social costs and benefits should shape individuals’ choices to speak up or remain silent. I 
suggest both situational (social) features and individual characteristics that ought to influence 
whether an individual speaks up for tolerance.  
 Chapter 3 asks whether those holding politically tolerant attitudes will be willing to act 
on these attitudes.  Political tolerance matters are often quite contentious, and there is a reason to 
expect that even the tolerant will not want to be vocal advocates for the rights of groups they 
oppose.  Evidence from a survey experiment and a nationally representative survey demonstrate 
that the tolerant and intolerant are differentially willing to publicly voice their support.  
However, the experimental evidence shows very few individuals are willing to engage in face-to-
face advocacy for their political tolerance.  
 Perhaps one way to explain an unwillingness to extend political rights to a disliked group 
like the Westboro Baptist Church (examined in Chapter 3) derives from a deeper commitment 
against prejudice, particularly that directed towards gays and lesbians.  Chapter 4 tests this 
possibility by examining whether individuals are willing to stand up for social tolerance (and 
against hate speech) in a hypothetical third person scenario.  The evidence suggests that 
individuals are largely unwilling to stand up for tolerance in social settings.  Thus, low levels of 
support for and advocacy on behalf of tolerance in Chapter 3 cannot be explained by a principled 
stance against prejudice, at least not one likely to manifest in behavior. Furthermore, individuals 
unwilling to speak up in both situations seem to share some key characteristics. 
 The previous chapters demonstrate that active tolerance is in short supply. For this 
reason, Chapter 5 takes a step back to ask whether tolerance could be beneficial in interpersonal 
situations. If people could model active tolerance, would it be worth it? Can individuals really 
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receive the supposed benefits of tolerance? Using a survey experiment, I investigate whether the 
benefits of tolerance laid out by democratic theorists exist in practice.  
 Finally, the concluding chapter (Chapter 6) offers an overall assessment about whether 
we truly possess the courage of our convictions—that is, whether we are willing to do more than 
simply hold a tolerant attitude, whether we are willing to act.  Although the evidence suggests 
that individuals generally lack the courage of their conviction, I suggest that this depressing 
conclusion need not be hopeless.  I propose several avenues for correcting this democratic 
deficit. After all, “the public has no hands except those of individual human beings” (Dewey 




FROM ATTITUDES TO ACTION:  
SOCIAL INFLUENCE AS A CONSTRAINT ON TOLERANCE 
 
 
 The contention of this project is that we must carefully consider why tolerance is valuable 
and what it will take from citizens to create a more tolerant society.  Of course, questions might 
legitimately be raised about just what is meant by tolerance. As I understand tolerance for this 
project, there are two distinct forms—political tolerance and social tolerance.  Because the two 
concepts can be defined in many ways, clear definitions must be provided.  I draw on Mondak 
and Sanders’ (2003) definition of political tolerance. They write: “People are tolerant to the 
extent that they are willing to grant the full rights of citizenship uniformly and without 
exception” (p. 496).  Extending citizenship rights is important; however, citizenship rights do not 
by themselves constitute our social relationships.  For peaceful coexistence in democratic 
society, we also need social tolerance.  Social tolerance means accepting variation in others—
whether in terms of religion, race, sexuality, or other social categories.2 Social tolerance does not 
necessarily require approval, but by accepting variation, active social tolerance requires 
opposition to discrimination. It requires citizens who are willing to do what it takes to encourage 
peaceful coexistence.  
 It is easy to imagine cases where our instincts to preserve social and political tolerance 
might be at odds. We are often challenged to be politically tolerant of individuals espousing 
prejudice and discrimination. Thus, trying to uphold both social and political tolerance is a 
difficult task. In cases like these, what should we do?  I argue that when we encounter an 
instance of intolerance we may initially see only two choices.  Either we say nothing, thus 
																																																								
2 This definition is in line with Weldon’s (2006) definition of social tolerance “the right to 
express cultural difference and the acceptance of this by the native population” (p. 335). 
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tolerating the speech and tacitly enabling the intolerant person. This possibility preserves 
political tolerance while sacrificing an opportunity to combat social intolerance. Alternatively, 
we could shut down the intolerance and risk being intolerant ourselves. This option promotes 
social tolerance while sacrificing political tolerance.  Both choices, therefore, are less than ideal.  
However, there is a third option allowing us to preserve social and political tolerance 
simultaneously—let intolerant persons speak, but then respond to their claims. 
 Thus, we must let all—even those with offensive views—into the public square.  We 
cannot silence them or their ideas.  But we also have a fundamental responsibility to voice our 
understanding of truth in response, to show others who have yet to make up their minds what is 
at stake.  More than that, we have obligations to each other in our use of discussion: “Instead of 
any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of 
others” (Mill 1989, p. 76). Here, again, Mill highlights the importance of engagement with 
others.  We can promote the good of others through these discursive encounters and we can stand 
up for those who cannot voice their interests.   
 Just as importantly, we cannot be ignorant to the potential consequences of speech. While 
the law considers the only dangers of speech to be physical in nature, there are many who have 
considered other non-physical harms of speech. Most expression does not rise to the level of 
posing a physical threat, but there is reason to imagine that discussion can help us combat other 
material, or even psychological, harms: “As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects 
prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the 
general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion” 
(Mill 1989, p. 76).  
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 More recently, scholars studying multiculturalism have suggested just how pervasive 
psychological harms may be for members of demographic minority groups. “The projection of 
an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the 
image is internalized” (Taylor 1994, p. 36). Given the possibility for potential harm, democratic 
citizens must be ready and willing to challenge speech that demeans.  Again, there are a number 
of plausible ways to address this sort of speech: (1) through force, (2) through anti-hate speech 
laws like those adopted in many other Western democracies, or (3) through discussion. Force can 
be ruled out for both its anti-democratic nature and the fact that it cannot address the root of 
intolerance.  Legal remedies, a more appealing option, are less than optimal because we value 
freedom of expression and these remedies may themselves lead to a number of dangerous 
consequences (Baker 2009). This leaves communication-based approaches as the best way to 
address instances of intolerance. Intervention, then, should not take the form of silencing speech, 
but instead response, interaction, and discussion. 
 The challenge of this task, however, cannot be overstated.  Often we would like to think 
that we would take a stand when someone’s rights or status are threatened. After all, it feels good 
to be noble. But saying we would stand up for someone and actually standing up for someone are 
quite different things—one is relatively easy and one is more challenging and potentially costly. 
Although believing or claiming we would act may help us preserve our own self-concept, 
knowing whether we would truly act on our convictions is important politically. Letting someone 
else be harassed or repressed could mean avoiding some backlash, but in addition to hurting the 
harassed person, this action may institute a social norm with consequences for our political 
culture (Chein 1946; Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, and Vaughn 1994). Staying silent when 
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teachers are fired for their political views may help us distance ourselves from those 
controversial views, but it also grants the state leeway to challenge our rights. 
 The key distinction between what we imagine we would do and what we actually do is the 
social context in which we do it. In the abstract, there is no resistance. We can stand up for 
someone because it is the right thing to do. In reality, standing up for a teacher with controversial 
views may require a heated interaction with a neighbor, an interaction we would much prefer to 
avoid. Is it worth burning that bridge and potentially damaging a relationship to stand up for 
someone else? These are the questions that weigh on us in real life. 
 
How does social pressure matter for tolerance? 
 One of our strongest social needs is the need to conform, a need that is demonstrated 
when individuals adopt beliefs or behaviors that they perceive to be closer to some group norm. 
Conformity helps individuals fit in, gain respect, suppress dissent, and coordinate efforts (see 
Cialdini and Goldstein 2004 for a review). At its most basic, it makes social interactions 
predictable. When it comes to matters of tolerance, conformity could be either positive or 
negative. It has the potential to be positive if people believe others to be tolerant. A norm of 
political or social tolerance could silence those who would dissent (LaPiere 1934; Blanchard et 
al. 1994). However, conformity could negatively influence tolerance if the perceived norm was 
one of intolerance. This latter possibility is my key concern. Rather than supporting a threatened 
minority, we may choose to stay silent even when this silence undermines our true attitudes. This 
silence is the more insidious conformity that we face each day, perhaps out of fear of retribution, 
our own dislike of conflict, or simply an urge to remain polite. In cases where we remain silent, 
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silence can be considered a form of consent or assent to whatever opinion is prevalent or 
whatever action is occurring. 
 Considering this type of conformity calls to mind several questions. Which individuals 
are most likely to conform/remain silent? When? Which individuals are the most likely to speak 
up for others? Under what conditions? Will individuals conform to the same extent if a norm is 
one of tolerance versus one of intolerance? Will the urge to conform influence private attitudes 
and publicly expressed attitudes in different ways? 
 The most broadly used model developed in psychology connecting attitudes to behavior 
is the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1985) which builds on the theory of reasoned action 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) and emphasizes that action is shaped by three types of 
considerations—behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs, and control beliefs. These normative 
beliefs, which highlight the role of social normative pressure and perceptions about the 
judgments of others, are the ones I expect to be most relevant to the expression of tolerance.  
 Despite a lengthy literature highlighting the disjuncture between attitudes and behavior 
(for a review, see Ajzen 2012), few political scientists have applied the insights to the study of 
tolerance.  In particular, subjective norms are very infrequently invoked. I seek to fill that void 
by considering how the social world influences individuals’ choices to speak up for others. 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the basic process. If we assumed a completely naïve model we would 
imagine that people use their opinions to make sense of the appropriate action, and then act (i.e. 
“My belief in equality should lead me to stand up for equality”). However, the “Social Influence 
Model” adds in an additional final step in the model that incorporates our social surroundings. 
We may know the most straightforward action given our beliefs, but whether we choose to act 
requires an evaluation of these surroundings (i.e. “What is everyone else doing?  Will I ruffle 
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feathers if I speak up? Is action costly because I am not acting in a void?”). This combination of 
our own attitudes and the signals we can gather from the social world lead us to choose whether 
to act and what action to take. This suggests that a transformation may happen between our 
attitudes and our behavior.  
 
Figure 2.1 How the social world factors into our decision-making process 
 
Note. In the naïve model, individuals hold attitudes and those attitudes neatly translate into action (i.e. if one values 
tolerance, they should want to take action for others). In the social influence model, however, social concerns factor 
into individuals’ decision-making processes, affecting whether an individual acts or stays silent.  This means that the 
decision might be different from the naïve model (i.e. the individual who values tolerance may not act on their 
attitude, or may even act to repress depending on the social context). 
 
 
 To more concretely explain the specific process relevant to tolerance, Figure 2.2 builds 
on the basic model.  Importantly, Figure 2.2 shows three different avenues that lead to silence. 
Two avenues lead to standing up for others and two lead to repressing or marginalizing others. 
 But which social circumstances, specifically, ought to be relevant to our decisions? I 
argue that what we try to learn from the social world is whether others are in agreement with our 
position and whether they would support our action. It is easier to act when we do not fear 
becoming isolated (Williams 2001). However, perceiving social cues is not always so simple or 
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clear. Therefore, actual group opinion matters, but so does the clarity of this opinion (Zitek and 
Hebl 2007). Figure 2.3 depicts this relationship. 
 
Figure 2.2. How the social world matters for tolerance 
 
Note. An individuals’ tolerance attitude can lead them to prefer standing up for others, remaining silent, or choosing 
to actively repress a group. However, before they act, they take account of social circumstances and when there is 
pressure against their position, individuals will be more likely to stay silent than to take action. Thus, individuals’ 
ability to act on their attitudes will depend upon social circumstances and their ability to overcome social pressure. 
  
 When opinion leans clearly in one direction, individuals who hold a similar opinion will 
be more willing to take action. When opinion is less clear, individuals will choose instead to 
remain silent rather than speak up. I do not expect many to be turned by social pressure from 
their previous opinion to acting in an opposing way. Although that may happen occasionally, the 
far more likely outcome is silence rather than being swayed to the point of action. 
 Because clear signals are challenging to come by, individuals will often fall prey to the 
false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House 1977; Mullen and Hu 1988) or to pluralistic 
ignorance (Miller, Monin, and Prentice 2000; Shelton and Richeson 2005), assuming that others 
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share their position or assuming others do not act because they agree with what is occurring, 
respectively. This is yet another factor that weighs against a minority group that faces some sort 
of ill. 
 
Figure 2.3. What determines how social pressure will influence us? Clarity and Consensus 
 
Note. The boxes display the expected individual-level responses under conditions in which social signals vary in 
valence and clarity. 
 
 Perceived consensus, then, is highly relevant to individuals’ decisions about when to act 
and when to remain silent. This is often an important influence in studies of prejudice and 
discrimination. Perceived consensus is one cue that suggests to individuals that they can translate 
their prejudiced beliefs into discriminatory actions. To again reference the example from before, 
when racially prejudiced students were told that others shared their beliefs, they sat father away 
from an African American confederate than those who were told there was no such consensus 
(Sechrist and Stangor 2001). Social consensus, then, can serve as informal social permission to 
exercise the attitudes that might not otherwise influence behavior. 
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 While previous work has looked at individual determinants of tolerance, I am interested 
both in individual- and group-level determinants of tolerance. Individual and group 
characteristics matter on their own, but also in combination with one another. At the individual 
level, preference strength, personality, and gender should all matter for whether an individual 
expresses their tolerance.   
 Consistent with previous literature, I expect that individuals with strong preferences will 
be more willing to act (Marcus et al. 1995). Although there is no perfect match between attitudes 
and behavior, the theory of planned behavior certainly suggests that attitudes may influence 
behavior, particularly strong attitudes. Additionally, I expect factors that make individuals more 
comfortable speaking up in general will make them more willing to express tolerance attitudes. 
Personality differences have been studied in connection with tolerance attitudes in the past 
(Sniderman 1975; Marcus et al. 1995) and there is good reason to think they should also matter 
for behavior because speaking up for tolerance poses social challenges.  Thus, I expect that 
extraverted individuals who are more comfortable with social interaction will be more likely to 
speak up for tolerance. Finally, with respect to gender, women have been found to be both less 
politically tolerant and less willing to engage in political conflict (Gibson 1992; Golebiowska 
1999; Ulbig and Funk 1999). For this reason, I expect women to be less likely to speak up for 
political tolerance. Importantly, how these individual traits matter will vary depending on social 
circumstances.  
 Given the importance of social influence for these processes, the experiments in chapters 
3, 4, and 5 all attempt to incorporate social influence and/or make individuals think about the 
social consequences they may face in a tolerance dilemma. If we want to preserve the right of the 
minority to be heard or preserve the societal benefits of hearing diverse positions, then we need 
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to understand how and when social influence might silence minority viewpoints and threaten 
rights more generally. Potentially, social influence can also help us uphold and protect a 
minority’s right to express a less popular or unpopular view. For this reason, scholars must be 
aware of the variety of social contexts in which influence may play out. Each context explored is 
the following chapters is one that people commonly experience and one that provides a setting in 
which tolerance attitudes are brought from abstract thought to action. While tolerance attitudes 
held in our minds are important, whether our society is a tolerant or intolerant one depends on 





POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN THE SOCIAL CONTEXT:  
HOW OPINION CLIMATE MATTERS 
 
 
 The strength of American democracy depends upon the free exchange of ideas. When 
citizens make political decisions, whether at the voting booth, at town hall meetings, or through 
political discussion, those decisions can affect others’ lives. Thus, citizens must be able to listen 
to one another’s perspectives and arguments when forming their own preferences.  But this type 
of interpersonal communication requires tolerance—a willingness to listen to the other side even 
when we strongly disagree. Years of research into political tolerance are premised on this fact. 
Yet when a dilemma arises that requires individuals to affirm their democratic values, it can be 
challenging to predict whether intolerant or tolerant voices will be heard. Partially, this is a result 
of the malleability of tolerance attitudes (Gibson 1998; Marcus et al. 1995; Sniderman et al. 
1996). But additionally, I suggest it is a result of a relative dearth of information about when 
tolerant attitudes will translate into tolerant behavior.  
 It is a particularly challenging thing to speak up on behalf of the political rights of a 
group with whom one disagrees. Taking a bold stand for the rights of a group like the KKK or 
Westboro Baptist Church can be accompanied by a social stigma. Less contentious situations, 
like sticking up for a classmate or co-worker in the political minority during a political 
discussion, might be instances we face more often, but there too we may find that silence seems 
easier than tolerance. Thus, there are many reasons to think that individuals will choose silence 
in the face of political intolerance. They may even embrace intolerance to escape being 
associated with a disliked group. Although political scientists possess a great deal of knowledge 
about tolerance attitudes, it is more challenging to assess whether and when individuals will face 
a potential social stigma and speak up for tolerance. 
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 This chapter provides a first step towards assessing whether and when tolerant 
individuals will speak up for their tolerant attitudes. First, I highlight scholarly work that has 
addressed or gestured at the behavioral implications of political tolerance attitudes and use this 
literature to derive hypotheses. Next, I design and present results from a survey experiment 
administered to a student sample, which demonstrates the relative unwillingness of most people 
to stand up for their tolerance attitudes. Because my student sample is unrepresentative of the 
population, I also supplement the experimental results with analysis of representative survey data 
that speaks to broader patterns of participation among the tolerant and intolerant. Finally, I 
conclude with a discussion of what these results mean for the persistence of political intolerance. 
 
Political Tolerance: Attitudes that Matter? 
  The study of political tolerance has provided political scientists with a strong 
understanding of the factors that structure and shape tolerance attitudes. Early studies found 
pervasive intolerance in the American public (Stouffer 1955) and an unwillingness to apply 
support of democratic principles to specific cases (Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964). 
Since these early studies, examinations of tolerance have been motivated by a deep concern for 
what intolerance may lead to in a democracy, namely the undermining of democratic attitudes 
and political competition. 
 Subsequent research has broadened the study of tolerance, looking across target groups 
(Gibson and Bingham 1982) and creating content-controlled measures of political tolerance 
(Sullivan et al. 1982). This research has demonstrated that self-reported levels of political 
tolerance in society are generally low (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1979; Chong 2006)3 and 																																																								
3 A number of studies take exception to this and document tolerance rising substantially (Nunn, Crockett, 
and Williams 1978; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Schafer and Shaw 2009). However, other scholars 
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experimental research suggests that tolerance is relatively weak and pliable (Gibson 1998; 
Marcus et al. 1995; Kuklinski et al. 1991; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001; Sniderman et al. 
1996). However, giving tolerant responses to a survey is not the same as taking tolerant actions 
in society.  
 Additionally, there is reason to suspect that this pliability poses a challenge when we 
consider who will take action on a civil liberties dispute. Because individuals are often 
conflicted—pulled between separate sets of democratic values like liberty and equality 
(Sniderman et al. 1996; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001)—they may possess weaker tolerance 
attitudes. For instance, individuals who are more conflicted about their opinion are frequently 
less confident in their judgments (Tetlock 1986, Sniderman 1993) and more persuadable 
(McGraw and Glathar 1994).  
 Furthermore, there is particular reason to doubt that tolerant attitudes will lead to tolerant 
behavior. When tolerance scholars have examined behavior, the evidence has been mixed about 
whether the tolerant or the intolerant are more likely to act on their convictions (Gibson 1987; 
Marcus et al. 1995; Abbarno 2013). However, many studies point to the fact that we cannot take 
for granted that individuals will act on their attitudes (LaPiere 1934; Ajzen and Fishbein 1977, 
for a review). 
 Finally, in an attempt to illustrate the importance of argument in shaping individuals’ 
value priorities, scholars have developed lines of research that attempt to persuade individuals 
away from their initial stances on civil liberties conflicts (Chong 1993; Sniderman et al. 1996). 
This research has even posed the problem in terms of responsiveness to pressure: 
However valuable it is to know whether citizens will support a fundamental democratic 
right in the absence of pressure, it is still more important to go on and to ask whether they 																																																																																																																																																																																		
point out that these increases are attributable to changing targets of intolerance and measurement issues 
(Mondak and Sanders 2003; Gibson 2013).	
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will hold on to their positions in the face of pressure to change them. Will citizens who 
support freedom of speech stand firm if they are presented with a plausible reason for 
changing their minds? Can those who initially oppose freedom of expression be induced 
to support it? (Sniderman et al. 1996, p. 55) 
 
Although these scholars refer to pressure in an attempt to highlight the importance of argument 
and reasoning in civil liberties attitudes, the authors may also be conflating the influence of 
argument with the effects of social pressure. Disentangling the influence of arguments from the 
influence of social pressure holds great opportunities for future research. Although highly pliable 
tolerance judgments are concerning no matter what, these two pathways to attitude change might 
raise different levels of concern. A person’s ability to alter their tolerance judgments in response 
to a compelling reason could be considered a rational and even beneficial process. A person 
altering their judgment to any pressure put on them by another person would be more troubling.  
  Because political tolerance attitudes matter in a social context, it is crucial for 
researchers to consider the way the social environment shapes their expression. The makeup of a 
group or community may influence how and whether individuals voice their tolerance attitudes. 
Individuals may also hold different expectations about whether they should conform depending 
on their social surroundings (Sechrist and Stangor 2007; Verhulst and Levitan 2009). Thinking 
about attitudes in the abstract shields these factors from view. 
 
Social Learning and the Expression of Political Tolerance 
 I argue that we must think about how people consider their social surroundings and the 
opinions of their peers when deciding whether to be vocally tolerant. But, how do we learn the 
attitudes of others? How do we decide what is socially acceptable? Although questions of 
political tolerance may not be an everyday discussion for most, we have access to a great deal of 
information about the preferences of our friends, neighbors, and communities. We can look to 
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traditional media for national or local opinion polls. We can seek out ideological media for quick 
polls taken by individuals who are similar to us. We can access social media to see whether and 
how our friends or contacts discuss the issues of the day. Finally, we talk to others and learn the 
opinions of others through social interactions. Rather than this information being simply 
available to us, in many ways the attitudes of our peers and communities are inescapable. Thus, 
when a tolerance dilemma arises we can quickly learn the positions of those around us. 
 Given the proliferation of information about the opinions and attitudes of others, we learn 
to adapt to and incorporate this information into our own attitudes and actions. Noelle-
Neumann’s (1974) famous “spiral of silence” theory first suggested that opinion polling may 
silence minority voices, turning polls into self-fulfilling prophecies. Her work sparked many 
studies following up on this potentially silencing influence of media reporting. This work and 
some of the studies that followed have demonstrated that individuals may choose silence when 
they do not believe that others agree with them (Moy, Domke, and Stamm 2001; Hayes 2007). 
 There is great reason to wonder whether and how polling results or other social 
information may influence our own willingness to speak out on behalf of others. In classic 
tolerance studies, individuals are asked whether they support the rights of a disliked group to 
rally in their communities or teach in their schools. While some individuals might succeed at 
ignoring social pressure, others look for social cues to know how to feel and whether their own 
beliefs coincide with others.  
 Tolerance conflicts often provoke individuals to respond, but these conflicts are also 
inherently controversial. This means that individuals that choose to speak or act may face 
judgment from others for their opinions on controversial issues. If democracy often requires us to 
stand up for others, then it is important that we are willing to stand up for others in the face of 
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controversy and potentially in the face of social disapproval. Similarly, to change the visible 
content of local attitudes, sometimes we must be willing to express divergent opinions on forums 
like social media. But again, all these actions come attached to potential social costs. For this 
reason, this chapter asks, when people know the potential cost (that is, when people know 
whether their opinion coincides with the minority or majority), does this make them more or less 
willing to publicly express their own opinion?  
 The spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann 1974) seems particularly likely to matter when it 
comes to the expression of tolerance attitudes. If political opinions generally are contentious 
topics, questions of political tolerance are even more contentious. Individuals may perceive a 
social cost to speaking out on a matter of tolerance. So, when people discover a local consensus 
favoring or opposing free speech, are they equally likely to favor or oppose a free speech event, 
or will they fall prey to social pressure?  Are they equally likely to speak out and to hold their 
position publicly? Finally, are individuals willing to engage in the social confrontations 
sometimes required of us to stake their position?  
 Consistent with the spiral of silence theory, I expect individuals to choose silence more 
often than voice, particularly when they perceive themselves to be in the minority. So, tolerant 
individuals who find out others are tolerant will be more willing to act on their attitudes while 
intolerant individuals who find out others are tolerant will be less willing to act on their attitudes. 
Similarly, intolerant individuals who find out others are intolerant will be more willing to act on 
their attitudes while tolerant individuals who find out others are intolerant will be less willing to 
act on their attitudes. These expectations highlight the importance of the normative beliefs 
highlighted by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and the importance of clear group norms (Zitek and 
Hebl 2007). 
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 These expectations reflect the idea that people, in general, will be more likely to speak up 
when they perceive themselves to be in the majority. However, previous research suggests that 
the tolerant and the intolerant may have different propensities for action. Will tolerant or 
intolerant individuals be more likely to express their opinions? There is evidence on both sides. 
Elites, who are more likely to have internalized democratic norms like tolerance, are also more 
likely to act on their tolerance (McClosky 1964; Prothro and Grigg 1960). Other studies suggest 
reason to expect greater activity among the intolerant (Gibson and Bingham 1985; Marcus et al. 
1995). Furthermore, more recent work has pointed to a potential tradeoff between tolerance and 
participation (Mutz 2006), further complicating the story. Thus, I do not hold strong a priori 
expectations about whether the intolerant or the tolerant will be more willing to act. 
 Additionally, I expect individual differences and attitudes to influence behavior as well. 
First, attitudes towards the target group will make some individuals more willing to act on their 
tolerance than others. Those with particularly negative views of the Westboro Baptist Church 
should be less likely to act if they are tolerant, but more likely to act if they are intolerant. 
Personality differences should also exert an influence. As described in Chapter 2, feeling 
comfortable with social interaction will help individuals deal with potentially contentious 
situations that often surround tolerance dilemmas. For this reason, I expect extraverts to be more 
willing to act in public and to engage in expressive activities, especially activities that involve 
face-to-face interaction.  Consistent with previous findings in the political tolerance literature, I 
also expect attitude strength to predict willingness to act on one’s attitudes. Those who possess 
stronger tolerance attitudes should be more willing to speak out in support of their beliefs. This 
effect may work through normative perceptions. Ajzen and Fishbein argue “readily accessible or 
strong attitudes are more likely than less accessible attitudes to bias perception and judgments” 
	 32	
(2005, p. 186). Attitudes matter because they may shape how individuals perceive their 
environments. For instance, normative perceptions or individuals belief in their own power to 
influence others may be directly related to the strength of their beliefs. 
   
Research Design 
 To test these expectations, I design an experiment that draws on Mutz’s (1998) work, 
Impersonal Influence. In her book, Mutz argues that people frequently shift their opinions based 
on their perceptions of the opinions of others. To assess the impact of the collective opinion of 
others on individuals’ attitudes, she designs experiments where individuals receive cues about 
these attitudes. Although she is primarily interested in how these social information cues 
influence mass attitudes, here, I am interested in whether these cues affect the likelihood of 
actively expressing an opinion in response. I provide individuals with a scenario like those that 
are common in the tolerance literature. Specifically, I ask respondents to indicate and explain 
whether they favor or oppose allowing an impending demonstration in town by the Westboro 
Baptist Church. I invoke social pressure by suggesting that there is a majority opinion among 
their peers and I manipulate whether the majority (78%) supports or opposes this demonstration. 
I include a control condition; participants in this condition do not receive a cue about peer 
preferences whatsoever. This private attitudinal measure should highlight whether individuals 
seem to shift their opinion in response to the information about others’ preferences.  
 Additionally, I include two public behavioral measures—one that strictly requires social 
interaction and one that does not. First, I ask subjects whether they would be willing to have their 
opinion publicized in the student newspaper. This question has multiple stages that require the 
student’s opinion to be increasingly public. Initially, subjects were asked to provide a quote that 
	 33	
summarizes their opinion about the demonstration. Then, they were asked whether their opinion 
could be published anonymously in the student newspaper. Finally, they were asked whether 
they will allow their name and major to be published alongside their quote. Second, I ask how 
likely subjects would be to attend a meeting on this topic and voice their opinion. Both of these 
measures tap into a more active version of tolerance and require individuals to express a 
willingness to take a public stand. The experiment should help demonstrate whether individuals 
are more willing to be tolerant or intolerant when provided with information about perceived 
consensus in the local (in this case, campus) community. 
 
Results4 
 The survey was administered to a student sample in November and December of 2014. 
The sample contained 291 subjects. The three conditions varied some in the amount of 
respondents. Ninety-nine subjects were in the “Control” condition; eighty-eight subjects read that 
the majority of students “Oppose” allowing the WBC to demonstrate; and, one hundred and four 
subjects were in the “Support” condition, where they were exposed to information that suggested 
that most students supported allowing the WBC to demonstrate. The sample is unusual in a few 
respects, but in line with other student samples.  The sample leans Democratic (65%), liberal 
(66%), white (69%), and female (54%).  
 
Attitudes 
 For the most part, subjects were very intolerant and strongly opposed to allowing the 
Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) demonstration. Only 22% favored allowing the demonstration. 
																																																								
4 The full text of the survey can be found in the appendix.	
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Importantly, individuals received the treatment before they made their own determination about 
whether the demonstration should be allowed. For this reason, I investigate what influences 
whether individuals were tolerant, and specifically whether the treatment conditions contributed 
to these attitudes.  
Table 3.1. Tolerant Attitudes by Condition 
 
 Allow WBC Demonstration 
 Coef S.E. 
Intercept 0.52 0.62 
Majority Tolerant 0.75 0.36* 
Majority Intolerant 0.55 0.39 
Female -1.30 0.31*** 
Ideology -0.13 0.10 
WBC FT 0.02 0.01+ 
AIC 269.91 
N 287 
Note: +p<.1; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Coefficients in the table are from a logistic regression 
model. The dependent variable assumes a value of 1 when individuals would allow the demonstration, 0 
otherwise. 
 
 In fact, Table 3.1 shows that the experiment does seem to exert an effect on tolerance 
attitudes. In particular, finding out that others are tolerant increases tolerant responses relative to 
the control condition. There is not a similar effect of being told others are intolerant. The 
intolerant condition actually seems to encourage tolerance as well, although this difference is not 
statistically significant. Additionally, gender and attitudes towards the Westboro Baptist Church 
exert a significant influence on tolerance as well. Consistent with previous work on political 
tolerance, women are less likely to hold tolerant attitudes. Female respondents were particularly 
likely to say that WBC should not be allowed to demonstrate in town. Expressing any positive 
feelings towards the Westboro Baptist Church also predicts a tolerant response.5 																																																								
5 The WBC feeling thermometer is heavily anchored at 0 with 75% of respondents reporting 0 degrees  
(or very cold feelings) towards the WBC. Less than 2% of respondents chose a response over 50 on the 
feeling thermometer. So this variable measures relatively limited variation between 0 and 50. The 
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 However, individuals varied on their reasons for supporting or opposing the 
demonstration and on the nuance of their positions. Some samples of the quotes they provided 
are listed below. 
Those who oppose… 
• Although me opposing the groups right to demonstrate is infringing on their freedom of 
speech, this group has been blatantly disrespectful at funerals and schools which disgusts 
me. Their message is not agreed with in the places they are picketing and they are simply 
unwanted. 
• There is a difference between free speech and hate speech, and hate speech should not be 
allowed or tolerated. 
• Fuck Westboro Baptist Church. 
• I think they misrepresent Christians. They are hateful against others, which against their 
own religion. 
• Freedom of speech is overrated 
• The Westboro Baptist Church is a hateful puppet organization. They spread pain, fear, 
and hate in the purest form. Their words do not belong in the Champaign-Urbana 
community. 
Those who support… 
• I do not believe what the WBC does is right, I stand firmly against their cause, especially 
when done at soldiers' funerals. However, it is a first amendment right to peacefully 
assemble, that's a cornerstone to our freedoms as Americans. So, while I would like to 
stop their demonstration, I would also like to reserve the right to demonstrate myself if I 
ever felt a cause deserved such action. You can't have it both ways. So, as long as they do 
it the proper way, they have a constitutional right to voice their opinions, however stupid 
those opinions may be. 
• I believe that everyone has the freedom of speech, but what they are saying and believe in 
is kind of ridiculous. 
• Everyone hates the Westboro Baptist Church, including me. They are homophobic, 
idiotic bigots. However, no matter how much people hate them, no matter how much they 
deserve to be hated, we still need to respect their right to free speech 
• While I am staunchly against the WBC, I believe in all people's right to assemble. 
• The right to free speech is the most important right we have. Even if I do not agree with 
the agenda of a demonstrating group, they should be allowed to do so as long as it is 
peaceful and lawful. If it is not lawful, they must be willing to accept all consequences to 
breaking the law. 
 
The quotes above demonstrate that a fair amount of variety existed in the opinions of both the 
tolerant and intolerant respondents. The fact that many quotes are bolstered by arguments also 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
constrained responses should also ease concerns about whether these individuals are actually “tolerant” of 
WBC or instead like the group.  
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demonstrates that most took this task seriously. Next, I investigate whether the treatments 
influenced whether subjects were willing to share these opinions with others. 
 
Anonymous and Identified Publication 
 As described above, individuals were asked whether we could publish the quote they 
provided anonymously and with their name attached in the student newspaper. Generally, most 
respondents (73%) agreed to have their quotes published anonymously. However, the majority 
(69%) chose not to publish their quote with their name attached. Individuals, it seems, choose 
silence when others can identify their position. Thus, while subjects were willing to share their 
opinions anonymously, they were unwilling to bear the social cost of doing so with their name 
attached.  
 But did learning social information change individuals’ willingness to publicly share their 
opinions? Next, I explore whether the treatments influenced the tolerant and intolerant 
differently. To unpack these differences Figure 3.1 compares individuals’ willingness to 
anonymously or identifiably publish their quotes. The bar charts demonstrate the percentage of 
those in each group who were willing or unwilling to share their quotes.  The figure also depicts 
the tolerant and intolerant separately, with red and blue bars respectively. Looking at the top 
figure, we see that individuals in general are very willing to publish their quotes anonymously. 
However, we also see that when the intolerant are told that a majority of students are tolerant (the 
Support condition), they are less willing to anonymously publish their quotes (falling from about 
80% sharing their quotations in the other two conditions to only 55%). The bottom graph 
highlights differences across groups about whether subjects were willing to publish their opinion 
in an identified way—with their name and major attached.  
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Note. The three experimental groups are listed on the horizontal axis. “Control” respondents received no 
social information.  Subjects in the “Oppose” condition were told that 78% of students opposed the 
demonstration. Subjects in the “Support” condition were told that 78% of students support the right of the 
WBC to demonstrate.  
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Here, we see that social pressure seems to matter for both the intolerant and tolerant, but in 
different ways. Somewhat surprisingly, the tolerant seem to be somewhat mobilized when they 
find out that others oppose the demonstration—suggesting when necessary the tolerant may be 
willing to speak up. It is important to note, however, that the number of tolerant in the Oppose 
condition is very small. Across all conditions individuals are less willing to share identified 
opinions, but for the tolerant, learning any kind of social information makes them more likely to 
speak up than those in the control condition. The intolerant, on the other hand, reveal the 
opposite pattern. When the intolerant believe others are tolerant (the Support condition), they are 
less likely to agree to publish their quote with their name attached.  
 The differences found between the tolerant and intolerant are somewhat encouraging. It 
seems like social pressure, in this instance, could help mobilize the tolerant and prevent the 
intolerant from limiting speech. Although only suggestive, these findings hint that when social 
considerations are brought to mind, the tolerant may be willing to take a stand while the 
intolerant may be reticent to publicly espouse their intolerance. However, it is important to note 
that there are many more individuals in the intolerant group than in the tolerant group. 
Furthermore, it is concerning that so many chose not to publicly share their opinions on this 
controversial matter.6   
 
Attend a Local Forum 
 While publishing an opinion is one important way to take public action, many other 
forms of action require face-to-face interaction.  Thus, I also asked respondents how likely they 																																																								
6 There might be occasions where one’s willingness to anonymously share an opinion could be 
sufficient to preserve tolerance. While this might be true if individuals voted on their tolerance 
judgments, opportunities to anonymously weigh in on tolerance attitudes do not abound. There 
may be exceptions in online anonymous message boards (like Reddit or Yik Yak), but views 
expressed in these forums rarely find voice in broader policy/government debates. 
	 39	
would be to attend a local forum to discuss the issue, on a scale of 0 to 100. Figure 3.2 
demonstrates first that the vast majority of subjects said they were unlikely to attend a local 
forum. In fact, 63% estimated their likelihood of attending a forum at less than a 50/50 chance. 
Once again, it seems that silence and inaction are the norm. Looking at the differences between 
the tolerant and intolerant, these figures highlight that the intolerant express greater interest in 
attending a local forum than the tolerant.  This may suggest that intolerance has an advantage in 
face-to-face activities, as the intolerant are more willing to take on the social costs of attending a 
local meeting to speak up.   
 
Figure 3.2 Reported Likelihood of Attending Forum 
 
n=66      n=224 
Note. Respondents indicated their expected likelihood of attending a forum to voice their attitudes about 
the WBC demonstration. The left graph represents those who believed the WBC should be allowed to 
demonstrate and the graph on the right includes those who believe the WBC should not be allowed to 
demonstrate. 
 
 Figure 3.3 examines the variation across conditions.  For almost all conditions, the 
tolerant and intolerant look very similar.  The average respondent reports a slightly less than 40% 
chance of attending a forum.  The one group that seems noticeably different is the tolerant in the 
	 40	
Support condition.  For those individuals, knowing others are generally tolerant lead them to be 
less willing to attend a local forum. This suggests that when individuals think others may stand 
up for tolerance, they sit back and let those others do it.  Perhaps this helps individuals avoid the 
social costs of tolerance. But we could also imagine that these results may present a collective 
action problem when it comes to mobilizing the tolerant for this type of interactive expression.  
 
Figure 3.3 Willingness to Attend Forum by Condition 
 
Note. The three experimental groups are listed on the horizontal axis. “Control” respondents received no 
social information.  Subjects in the “Oppose” condition were told that 78% of students opposed the 
demonstration. Subjects in the “Support” condition were told that 78% of students support the right of the 
WBC to demonstrate.  
 
 
Explaining variation across behaviors 
 Although it is clear that silence and inaction are fairly prevalent, it is also clear that 
willingness to act seems to vary by activity. What accounts for the differences in rates of 
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participation between types of activity? The type of person comfortable attending a public forum 
may be different than a person who chooses to publish a quote. To take just one example, 
attending a forum involves interpersonal interaction (and, potentially, confrontation) in a way 
that publish a quote does not. For this reason, I expect extraverts to be particularly willing to 
attend a public forum to speak out for their attitudes. This expectation is in line with past 
findings about extraverts’ participatory tendencies (Mondak 2010).   
 To understand the distinct roles of the experimental treatments and individual differences, 
I modeled the influence of these variables on the three different acts (publishing an opinion 
anonymously, publishing with a name attached, and attending a forum). Because the earlier 
results showed clear differences between how the tolerant and intolerant acted and responded to 
the treatments, I ran models for the tolerant and intolerant separately.  
 Tables 3.2 (a) and 3.2 (b) show that the two groups responded to the treatments 
differently, but they also show that individual differences mattered in different ways for the 
tolerant and intolerant. Positive feelings towards the WBC led tolerant individuals to be less 
likely to publish their opinions anonymously or with their names attached.  Although no one felt 
favorably towards the Westboro Baptist Church, there was variation in the extent to which 
individuals felt unfavorably. This variation mapped on to tolerance attitudes as well. Women 
were more likely to publish their tolerant quotes with their names attached. However, there is a 
sharp reversal for women when it comes to attending a forum; tolerant women were less likely 
than men to say they would attend a forum, although this result is not statistically significant. 
Finally, as found above, when the tolerant learned that others were generally tolerant it has a 
fairly clear demobilizing effect on forum attendance. It appears that if the tolerant expect 
someone else to stand up for tolerance, they gladly neglect this responsibility themselves.  
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 Among the intolerant, different patterns emerge. While the tolerant were content to sit on 
their hands when others appeared willing to represent their views, for the intolerant, finding out 
they were in the minority was what kept them from speaking up. Social pressure appears to work 
in different ways for tolerant and intolerant. This makes using social pressure to bolster tolerance 
a real challenge. The same message that might rein in the intolerant might also make the tolerant 
feel as if their efforts are unneeded.  
 
Table 3.2 (a). Tolerant Individuals: Who Acts? 
 
 Publish Anonymously Publish with Name Attend Forum 
 Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. 
Intercept 3.74 1.92+ -0.38 1.53 50.14 16.04** 
Majority Tolerant -0.30 0.89 0.91 0.80 -14.48 7.61+ 
Majority Intolerant -0.99 0.92 0.87 0.85 -2.98 8.39 
Extraversion -0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 -0.22 0.51 
Female 0.83 0.67 1.44 0.69* -4.84 6.49 
Ideology 0.14 0.26 0.00 0.21 -0.50 2.15 
WBC FT -0.06 0.02** -0.07 0.03* -0.10 0.19 
AIC/R2 74.44 83.023 0.09 
N 63 63 63 
Note: +p<.1; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Results for the first two models are coefficients from logistic 
regression models because the dependent variables are dichotomous. The third model is an OLS regression, where 
likelihood of forum attendance ranges from 0 to 100. 
 
Table 3.2 (b). Intolerant Individuals: Who Acts? 
 
 Publish Anonymously Publish with Name Attend Forum 
 Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. 
Intercept 1.58 0.87+ 0.17 0.87 39.14 10.63*** 
Majority Tolerant -1.36 0.39*** -0.32 0.38 -0.06 4.70 
Majority Intolerant -0.24 0.44 0.14 0.37 1.65 4.85 
Extraversion 0.05 0.03+ 0.02 0.02 0.75 0.31* 
Female -0.38 0.35 -0.23 0.33 -0.12 4.15 
Ideology -0.10 0.11 -0.33 0.12** -5.17 1.32*** 
WBC FT -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.40 0.15** 
AIC/R2 252.67 265.2 0.14 
N 218 218 218 
Note: +p<.1; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Results for the first two models are coefficients from logistic 
regression models because the dependent variables are dichotomous. The third model is an OLS regression, where 
likelihood of forum attendance ranges from 0 to 100. 
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 For the intolerant, learning that others are tolerant appears to lessen their willingness to 
act across the three types of behaviors, although this is only statistically significant for 
anonymous publication. Furthermore, though not significant, learning others are intolerant 
appears to encourage the intolerant to publicly express their opinions. Additionally, ideology 
seems to matter for action, with conservatives more reticent to take public action than liberals. 
Again, holding any positive feelings towards WBC makes individuals less likely to take action, 
and especially less likely to attend a local forum. Finally, extraversion is positively and 
significantly predictive of attending a local forum for the intolerant, in contrast to the tolerant. 
Here, being outgoing and comfortable with social interaction seems to make the intolerant more 
likely to voice their views at a local forum. 
 On the whole, the story is complicated. Social cues matter for action and so do individual 
differences. But how and when these cues, attitudes, and traits matter vary by the tolerance level 
of subjects too. Additionally, the results in the first set of models include a very small sample of 
tolerant individuals (63). The story is further complicated by the fact that attitude strength varies 
across the tolerant and intolerant. Among the intolerant, 68% of respondents identify themselves 
as “strongly opposing” WBC’s right to demonstrate. Among the tolerant, only 23% of subjects 
say they feel strongly in favor of WBC’s political rights. This difference in attitude strength 
bleeds into individuals’ willingness to take the actions requested of them. Figure 4.4 shows that 
the strongly tolerant act very much in the way we might hope. On average, they appear more 
likely than other groups to take the three actions. However, the strongly tolerant comprises a 
mere 5% of the sample. The majority of tolerant individuals consider themselves only 
“somewhat” tolerant, and these individuals are less likely to speak out for tolerance. 
Additionally, the strongly intolerant make up more than half of the sample (53%) and this 
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disparity has important consequences as well. The strongly intolerant are more likely than the 
somewhat intolerant to publish their opinion and to attend a forum. In the next section, I will 
explore how these differences alter the makeup of tolerance/intolerance among those who choose 
to act. 
 
Figure 3.4. Attitude Strength and Active Tolerance 
	  
 
Note. Circles indicate means surrounded by 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Reconciling these behaviors 
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 In the aggregate, what do these patterns suggest about when and how individuals will 
stand up for tolerance? How does a willingness to publicly speak or act change which opinions 
get represented? I find that different types of public action can lead to the representation of 
different opinions. Table 3.3 below demonstrates these differences. People who are willing to 
anonymously publish their opinions are quite representative of the actual distribution of opinion 
on the issue. However, the tolerant are more willing to publish their quote with a name attached 
than the intolerant. Thirty-eight percent of the tolerant would publish a quote with their name 
attached, while only 29% of the intolerant were willing to publish their opinion.7 On this basis 
alone, there might be reason to hope that the tolerant can be part of the conversation even if they 
are in the minority.  
 
Table 3.3. Distribution of Tolerance by Public Act 
 
 Favor Demonstration Oppose Demonstration 
All Attitudes Combined 20% 80% 
Publish Anonymously 22% 78% 
Publish with Name 27% 73% 
Attend Public Forum 15% 85% 
 
 But it is not all good news. As shown above, the politically intolerant are more willing 
than the politically tolerant to attend a public forum. In some ways we might expect that the 
strongly intolerant would be more willing to engage in a face-to-face confrontation on the issue. 
But it is discouraging that the tolerant seem to avoid this type of activity in particular. Across the 
two behavioral measures, one finding is clear.  People are typically unwilling to stand by their 
beliefs in the face of social pressure.  On the whole, these results also demonstrate that the nature 
of the public action an individual might take can influence who shows up at the table. In a 																																																								
7 Again, however, it is worth bearing in mind that there are many fewer tolerant individuals than 
intolerant individuals in the sample. 
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contentious situation, the tolerant are more likely to voice their beliefs in a less personal public 
format. Whether these patterns would hold up with a more even distribution of tolerance and 
intolerance, however, is an open question. 
 Although I do find evidence of a great deal of silence (particularly when it comes to 
attending a public forum), there is also some evidence that suggests that the social context is an 
important element that can encourage or discourage individuals to stand up for the rights of 
others. In some cases, the social context can encourage the tolerant to speak up at higher rates 
than the intolerant—like in voicing their beliefs in the newspaper, but in other areas the tolerant 
are particularly likely to be silent. 
 
Lingering concerns about generalizability 
 One particular concern with these data is that the tolerant group is so small in my student 
sample. The strongest reasons for hope from these experimental results is that when faced with 
social pressure, some of the tolerant seem to rise to the challenge of publicly expressing their 
beliefs more than the intolerant. But a small group, like the one in my sample, may be odd and 
challenging to draw generalizations from. Because this group might be made up of relative 
outliers, I supplemented this analysis by examining data from the 2014 General Social Survey to 
investigate whether the participatory tendencies of tolerant individuals can be found for other 
political activities. Unfortunately, the GSS data will not allow me to examine whether the 
tolerant will act specifically in cases where tolerance is at stake. However, understanding 
whether the tolerant or the intolerant are distinctively likely to take political action should reflect 
their willingness to act more generally.  
 The 2014 GSS is the only recent year of the survey that asks the same respondents about 
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their tolerance levels and about various forms of political participation, so it fits my purposes 
well. Descriptions of each measure are included below. 
 
Tolerance--In the 2014 GSS, respondents were asked about 6 different groups—atheists, 
militarists, communists, racists, homosexuals, and Muslim extremists. Respondents were asked 
whether each of these groups should be allowed to speak publicly, teach in a college, or ban a 
book they wrote from the library. Based on these questions a scale was constructed ranging from 
0 (the least tolerant responses across all groups) to 18 (the most tolerant responses across 
groups).  For instance, someone receiving an 18 on this scale responded that each of the six 
groups ought to be able to speak in public, teach college, and have a book they wrote in the 
library. Figure 3.5 below shows the distribution of tolerance in the 2014 survey. The modal 
response is an 18, or those who are perfectly tolerant (who believed all groups should be allowed 
all three types of expression), who comprise about 20% of the entire sample. The graph also 
demonstrates a great deal of variation in tolerance across the rest of the sample. 
 
Figure 3.5. Distribution of Tolerance and Participation in the 2014 GSS 
 
 In addition to this broader measure, two other measures of tolerance were constructed for 
ease of analysis, both dummy variables where 1 indicates tolerance and 0 intolerance. The first 
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version I refer to as “coarse” tolerance, and this measure splits respondents at the scale’s 
midpoint. By this measure, 68% of the sample is considered tolerant and 32% intolerant. The 
second version, which I refer to as “sharp” tolerance, is a dichotomous measure where those who 
are perfectly tolerant (or an 18 on the scale) are coded as a 1 and every other point on the scale is 
coded as a 0 (or intolerant). By this measure, 21% are tolerant and 79% are intolerant. Mondak 
and Sanders (2003) argue that the GSS is well-suited to examining this more constrained (and 
precise) version of tolerance. 
 
Participation—	Participation is an additive scale of 6 non-voting political participation activities, 
including signing a petition, attending a rally, contacting a government official, donating funds, 
joining a demonstration, and contacting or appearing in media to express your views. 
Respondents were asked for any given activity, whether they had “done it in the past year”, had 
“done it in the more distant past”, has “not done it but might do it, or has not done it” and “would 
never do it.” Each measure is scaled so the highest value (4) represents those who have 
participated in an activity within the last year and a score of 1 indicates individuals who stated 
they would never take the action. After adding the six responses together, the final additive scale 
was recoded to range from 0 to 1. The distribution of this participation measure is shown above 
in Figure 3.5. The distribution shows a range of participation, but also that lower levels of 
participation are typical of the average member of the GSS sample. 
 Although the overall sample size was 2,538 respondents, only 694 respondents answered 
both tolerance and participation questions. Two other questions help provide additional insight 
into the type of expressive activities likely to matter in speaking up for tolerance. Those who 
frequently talk about politics and attempt to persuade others might be especially likely to express 
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their tolerance attitudes and influence others with this form of participation. Two questions 
included on the 2014 GSS tapped into these activities. First, respondents were asked, “When you 
get together with your friends, relatives or fellow workers, how often do you discuss politics?”  
Additionally, respondents were asked, “When you hold a strong opinion about politics, how 
often do you try to persuade your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views?” I 
combined responses to these two questions into an additive scale of discussion/persuasion 
activities, where those high on this scale discuss politics and persuade others frequently. I 
analyzed the relationship between this measure and tolerance as an additional way to examine 
whether differences in participation exist between the tolerant and intolerant, differences likely 
to manifest in speaking up for tolerance. At the most basic level, sharing one’s views to convince 
another person to be tolerant or to understand tolerance is likely one of the simplest ways we can 
have an impact on tolerance in our everyday lives. Thus, this measure seems to capture those 
likely to act in this way fairly well. Although a very small number of people discuss politics 
frequently and attempt to change others minds frequently, less than 15% of the sample say they 
never discuss politics or persuade others, suggesting a fair amount of variation in the sample. 
This can be seen in Figure 3.6 below.  
 
Figure 3.6. Distribution of Discussion/Persuasion in the 2014 GSS
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 Next, I turn to see whether there are differences in participation rates between the tolerant 
and intolerant. For this initial analysis, I rely on the two dichotomous tolerance measures 
discussed above. Table 3.4 below shows mean differences in participation and 
discussion/persuasion between the tolerant and the intolerant using independent two-sample t-
tests. In all four cases, the difference between the tolerant and intolerant is statistically significant 
(p≤0.001) and in all four cases the tolerant participate and discuss politics/persuade others at 
higher rates than the intolerant. The consistent differences between the tolerant and intolerant 
suggest that those who are tolerant are more likely to be involved in democratic politics.  
 
Table 3.4 Mean Differences in Political Participation and Discussion/Persuasion by Tolerance 
 
Outcome Coarse Intolerant Coarse Tolerant Difference 
Participation 















Outcome Sharp Intolerant Sharp Tolerant Difference 
Participation 















Note. Differences reported in bold are the result of t-tests. All are significant at the p≤0.001 level.  
 
 
 This makes sense and corresponds to earlier evidence showing higher rates of tolerance 
among politically-involved elites (Stouffer 1955; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; 
McCloskey 1964) and in broader surveys of the American public (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 
1982).8 This work held that participation and tolerance were reinforcing. “The give and take 																																																								
8 Importantly, I am not positing a causal relationship or even a direction of the relationship. Additionally, 
because I am not concerned with the question of whether tolerance is responsible for increases in 
participation, it is less important to rule out alternative explanations as well. For my purposes, it is 
sufficient to establish whether tolerant and intolerant individuals are likely to be similarly active in 
democratic politics. The relative advantage of the tolerant is important because it gives some additional 
credibility to the more active tolerant group in the experiment.  
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required of those who participate in politics teaches citizens about different points of view, the 
necessity of bargaining and compromise, and the value of civil liberties” (Sullivan, Piereson, and 
Marcus 1982, p. 196). These findings in Table 3.4 appear consistent with this reasoning. 
 However, this finding is at odds with other strands of research. For instance, Mutz (2002; 
2006) demonstrates that as individuals are exposed to more disagreement in their social 
networks, they become more tolerant but less participatory. Although she does not focus on a 
direct relationship between tolerance and participation, the implication is that there is a tradeoff 
between the two. The results here do not suggest such a tradeoff, as tolerant individuals seem to 
be particularly willing to participate in non-voting behaviors as well as political discussion. To 
test for the possibility of a similar relationship to the one Mutz found, it is important to know 
how tolerance, discussion, and participation all relate to one another. To understand this 
relationship better, I ran two linear models to determine whether those who are both tolerant and 
engaged in political discussion and persuasion were less likely to exhibit participatory 
tendencies.  
 Table 3.5 shows the results of this analysis. The models predict participation and include 
controls for variables frequently related to participation including gender, race, party ID, 
ideology, education, age, and political interest.9 The first two columns in Table 3.5 contain 
results of a simple additive model, and the third and fourth columns contain results of a model 
including an interaction between discussion/persuasion and tolerance. Ideally, the tolerant would 
be active politically and attempting to talk about their views and persuade others. However, if 
there is a tradeoff between tolerance and participation, then as discussion and tolerance increase, 
participation should decline. The models in Table 3.5 demonstrate that discussion and tolerance 
																																																								9	Descriptive statistics for each variable can be found in the appendix.	
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have positive, direct, and significant influences on participation. Furthermore, the tolerant appear 
to gain more in participation as they engage more in political discussion and persuasion than the 
intolerant, although both groups show increases.  
 
Table 3.5. Predictors of Political Participation 
 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Intercept -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
Discussion/Persuasion 0.03 0.01*** 0.03 0.01*** 
Sharp Tolerance 0.05 0.02** -0.01 0.04 
Female -0.02 0.02 -0.2 0.01 
Nonwhite -0.07 0.02*** -0.07 0.02*** 
Party ID 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ideology -0.02 0.01*** -0.02 0.01** 
Education 0.02 0.00*** 0.02 0.00*** 
Age -0.00 0.00+ -0.00 0.00+ 
Interest 0.06 0.01*** 0.06 0.01*** 
Discussion x Tolerance - - 0.02 0.01* 
R2 0.39 0.39 
N 627 626 
 
 To visualize the combined influence of tolerance and discussion on political participation, 
Figure 3.7 shows the interactive relationship between the variables. On the left hand side of the 
graph, it appears that tolerant individuals who never discuss politics look nearly identical to 
intolerant individuals who do not discuss politics or persuade others. However, as individuals’ 
levels of discussion and persuasion increases, the tolerant differentiate themselves from the 
intolerant, participating at consistently higher levels than the intolerant. This relationship appears 
again to show that there is no clear tradeoff between political discussion and tolerance, on one 
hand, and political participation, on the other. 
 Overall, the GSS analysis paints a hopeful picture. Tolerant individuals participate at 
higher rates than the intolerant. Furthermore, the tolerant are more likely to discuss politics and 
attempt to persuade others to their views. This suggests that we should not be too quick to 
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dismiss the possibility of a more politically tolerant society. Although the perfectly tolerant are 
relatively small in number, their willingness to take political action and talk about politics could 
make them appear more numerate and prepare them for the challenge of speaking up when 
necessary. Despite these reasons for hope, though, there is no way for me to assess whether the 
tolerant will speak up and act in a case where tolerance is at stake. People who are politically 
tolerant do seem especially prepared to participate politically. The question remaining is how to 
get tolerant people, who are inclined toward political action, to take action when civil liberties 
are in jeopardy. 
 




 Do the results presented in this chapter suggest that individuals can meet their democratic 
potential? Unfortunately, the evidence is mixed.  Although at times social pressure can be a 
useful mobilizing force by encouraging the tolerant to publish their opinions, at others it seems to 
make voices of intolerance louder as with the public forum. Making the problem more 
challenging still, the social cues that seem to encourage the intolerant to quiet their opinions, also 
appear to demobilize the tolerant.   
 So are citizens up to the challenge of allowing offensive groups to participate? These data 
suggest reasons for skepticism. Most subjects in the experiment are highly intolerant and 
although the tolerant were sometimes mobilized by social information, at no time were there 
enough tolerant voices to outweigh the intolerant. At the same time, the evidence from the GSS 
seems mildly encouraging. The tolerant appear to be individuals well prepared to discuss their 
opinions and act on them, though, again, they are small in number. Reconciling the GSS data and 
the experimental data requires a larger and more representative sample. Moving forward, future 
work should attempt to investigate whether the experimental results hold in a larger sample, 
similar to the GSS.  
 One of the strongest messages from the experiment was the depth of the antipathy 
towards the Westboro Baptist Church’s message and strategies. As I noted previously, tolerance 
dilemmas are often framed as a tradeoff between social and political tolerance. If survey 
respondents brought this preconception to the experiment, perhaps they believed themselves to 
be upholding social tolerance by being politically intolerant. In other words, perhaps they 
believed they were taking a stand for gay rights by opposing the political rights of WBC. If this 
explanation rings true, then these same individuals might be well-suited to stand up for social 
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tolerance and to speak up in support of gays and lesbians. The silver lining of political 
intolerance might be the willingness of these individuals to intervene in order to preserve social 
tolerance, to speak up against hateful speech.  This next chapter examines this question. Will 





SPEAKING UP FOR SOCIAL TOLERANCE 
 
 
“In the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends.”-- 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 
  
 American attitudes toward homosexuality have changed a great deal in a short period of 
time. Over the past thirty years, attitudes towards gays and lesbians have dramatically improved 
according to measures of prejudice and approval as well as policy attitudes. Since 1991, 
individuals surveyed through the International Social Survey Program have been less likely to 
say that same-gender sex is wrong.  For those under 35, the difference is even starker: in 1991, 
only 17% of those under 35 said that same gender sex is not wrong at all; by 2008, nearly 44% 
agreed with that claim (Smith, Son, and Kim 2014). Attitudes toward gay rights policy attitudes 
have experienced similar shifts.  For instance, recent studies document a rapid increase in 
support for same-sex marriage, with majorities now supporting marriage rights for same-sex 
couples (Flores 2015).  
 Despite these positive tolerance trends, however, a substantial minority of individuals 
who hold intolerant attitudes remains. Remaining intolerance towards gays and lesbians helps 
explain ongoing discrimination against gays in the workplace (Tilcsik 2011) and in society at 
large. All this is to say that unless the intolerant never express their intolerance, there will always 
be opportunities for the tolerant to act. However, where intolerance exists, individuals who wish 
to challenge it must be prepared to contend with social pressure. 
 The previous chapter suggested that individuals were strongly intolerant and generally 
unwilling to speak up for political tolerance, contributing to the democratic problem spelled out 
earlier in this project. This chapter, by contrast, examines whether individuals will be willing to 
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stand up on behalf of social tolerance for minority groups, including gay people. If the reason 
that individuals refused to tolerate the Westboro Baptist Church in the previous chapter was 
because of a commitment to social tolerance—that is, to ensure individuals do not experience 
harassment or discrimination—then we should see a very different pattern when individuals are 
challenged to take a stand for social tolerance on behalf of gays.  If, instead, social influence 
plays a strong role, then we should once again see individuals who are reticent to stand up on 
behalf of tolerance.   
 Although gay people are just one example, several groups have seen socially tolerant 
attitudes on the rise despite ongoing examples of discrimination and harassment (Blanchard, 
Crandall, Brigham, and Vaughn 1994; Bobo and Dawson 2009; Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2004). Often when social scientists study social tolerance, they study attitudes. However, 
focusing exclusively on attitudes overlooks the nature of decisions individuals make when 
deciding whether and when to act tolerantly in their everyday lives. A narrow focus on attitudes 
also obscures the potential influence of social pressure that people face when interacting with 
others.  
 This chapter investigates whether individuals are willing to combat social intolerance by 
speaking up in the face of social pressure. Using a series of survey experiments that focus on 
multiple target groups including the LGBT community, racial minorities, and the disabled, I 
document a consistent gap between individuals’ social tolerance attitudes and their willingness to 
speak out on behalf of those attitudes. Regardless of target group, individuals seem unwilling to 
stand up for social tolerance. This chapter then goes on to address what motivates action or 
inaction. Exploring the roles of social context and individual differences, I highlight which traits 
and situations make tolerant action more likely. 
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Social tolerance in action 
 Everyone has been in a situation where we knew we could have spoken out but did not; 
situations where someone was being bullied, belittled, or harassed, and we chose not to act. This 
is particularly consequential when we repeatedly interact with people, like in schools or in the 
workplace. We may know we will see a person again and fear some type of social retribution. 
However, providing a rebuttal to hate speech or bias can yield many benefits. Beyond potential 
consequences for the individual or individuals being denigrated, choosing to respond to an act of 
intolerance can also create a norm of respect or tolerance, while choosing not to act may lead to 
an intolerant norm (Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Brien 2002).  
 Chances to take a stand for social tolerance abound in everyday life. We may hear jokes 
or derogatory comments with which we profoundly disagree. However, social pressure may 
prevent us from acting on our judgments. By staying silent, we risk tacitly approving of 
intolerant speech. Ultimately, these may seem like rather insignificant encounters, but they can 
have important consequences. For example, Ford et al. (2008) found that sexist men were more 
likely to cut funding from women’s programs after being exposed to sexist humor. To take 
another example, Czopp et al. (2006) find that when individuals who relied on stereotypes were 
confronted about their prejudice, they were less likely to make stereotypic associations in the 
future. Because individuals can contribute to these consequential social norms, it is important 
that people rise to the challenge and stand up for tolerance.  
 Although it may be important to speak up in these contexts, it is certainly not easy. The 
immediacy of the situation may require something closer to confrontation than explication and 
many people might prefer to avoid conflict (Ulbig and Funk 1999). In addition to engaging in 
confrontation, speaking up can require a certain amount of comfort with social interaction or 
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public speaking. It also requires individuals to disrupt norms of politeness. Although speaking up 
may be costly to individuals, it can benefit them as well. Confronting a person can assure us of 
our own self-image and can breed positive emotions (Gervais, Hillard, & Vescio, 2010). 
Social context and tolerance 
 To be clear, people are socially tolerant insofar as they reject prejudice and 
discrimination. However, some would consider tolerant attitudes and a policy of non-
intervention to be sufficient for tolerance. As I have described above, though, the existence of 
intolerance in a pluralistic society requires more from the tolerant than to simply look away. 
 Research on social tolerance has focused attention on the connection between attitudes 
and behavior. In particular, students of racial prejudice and discrimination have incorporated 
perceptions of social pressure into their research. Overt prejudice has declined over the past half-
century and norms of racial equality have taken precedence in public speech (Feldman and 
Huddy 2005; Mendelberg 2001). However, when scholars compare the prevalence of tolerant 
attitudes to discriminatory practices, they find that attitudes do not necessarily predict tolerant 
behavior. For instance, despite equal opportunity policies and egalitarian beliefs, in practice 
citizens continue to behave in intolerant ways. Following the example of audit studies (see Fix 
and Turner 1998 for a review), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) conducted a field experiment 
in hiring discrimination and found that whites received callbacks more frequently than blacks. 
Despite relatively low levels of prejudice discovered on surveys, discrimination is unfortunately 
quite present in reality. Because we know that these practices persist, we must account for what 
engenders the differences found between survey measures of prejudice and real world 
discrimination.  
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 There seem to be two potential explanations for these differences, both centering on 
social pressure. First, social pressure may be strong and different from the real world in the 
survey context. Participants may provide “correct” or socially acceptable beliefs in the survey, 
beliefs that censor or alter participants’ true attitudes to avoid those individuals being labeled as 
bigots. Research on social desirability bias suggests that participants may change their responses 
in exactly this way to project a vision of themselves they believe researchers will find palatable 
(Berinsky 2002, 2004; Huddy and Feldman 2009; Holbrook and Krosnick 2010). This is, no 
doubt, an important form of social influence that inhibits survey respondents and contributes to 
the disconnect between attitudes and behavior. However, there is an additional possibility—
social pressure may also act on individuals when they leave the survey context.  
Individuals may not be withholding their true attitudes in the survey. Instead, they may be 
accurately representing their attitudes to survey researchers, but responding to different social 
constraints and surroundings when they must act on these attitudes. Many of the experiences in 
life where one can discriminate involve other people, forcing social considerations into 
individual calculations about when and how to act. I contend that the only way we can fill in this 
picture is to consider social influence as a critical difference between our private feelings and our 
public actions.  
 Indeed, research has found that the social context often shapes prejudice and prejudice 
expression. Individuals tend to conform to the norms that seem to persist in any given group 
rather than to society’s norms at large. When people believe a perceived consensus exists which 
permits prejudice or intolerance, they alter their own attitudes and behavior. For instance, 
Stangor, Sechrist and Jost 2001 asked white students to report their own attitudes towards 
African Americans and those of their peers. Subsequently, subjects received information that 
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they had either over-estimated or under-estimated the level of prejudice among their peers. In a 
later survey, the researchers found that survey respondents shifted their views closer to that of 
their peers (Stangor, Sechrist, and Jost 2001). Social influence has also been shown to affect 
behavior similarly. When highly prejudiced students were led to believe that their peers shared 
their anti-black beliefs, they sat further away from an African American confederate (Sechrist 
and Stangor 2001).  
 These studies suggest how powerfully other people can influence our own decisions on 
matters of tolerance. These studies build on Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior (1985), which 
expounds on the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) and emphasizes that action 
is shaped by three types of considerations—behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs, and control 
beliefs. These normative beliefs, which highlight the role of social normative pressure and 
perceptions about the judgments of others, are the ones I expect to be most relevant to the 
expression of tolerance in part because they have been found to exert a great deal of influence on 
the expression of prejudice (Crandall et al. 2002). However, studies of prejudice infrequently 
include questions of when the tolerant or unprejudiced will act on their beliefs. Thus, I argue that 
to explain when individuals will speak up for tolerance we need to look at how social norms 
influence both those who are tolerant and those who are intolerant.  
 When prejudice is voiced or discrimination is endorsed, who will combat it?  In many 
situations, members of the group experiencing discrimination may be unable to speak for 
themselves or may be ignored. Even if this is not the case, evidence suggests that individuals 
who are not part of marginalized groups can be seen as more credible advocates on behalf of 
those groups than group members (Rasinski and Czopp 2010). This study suggests once again 
	 62	
why it might be so necessary that individuals stand up for others in the face of social pressure. 
Whether we are equipped to do this is an open question, and one I turn to next.  
 
Expectations 
 When will individuals speak up for social tolerance? While our own psychological 
motivations may partially explain why we speak up or stay silent, the situation often provides 
useful cues. We might assess whether others seem agitated, amused or silent, and use this 
information to decide what to do. If we sense we are not alone, we should be more likely to act. 
At the same time, we might stay silent if we believe that others agree with the expressed 
intolerance. In this way, we may choose not to act because others chose not to, justifying our 
own silence by that of those around us (Latané and Darley 1968).  
 I expect that when individuals must confront others to preserve social tolerance, they will 
be unlikely to do so because of social pressure. Simply priming individuals to think about social 
situations should make them more reticent to act on their attitudes. Furthermore, silence will be 
even more likely when individuals perceive others as approving of the intolerant. Finally, I 
expect individual motivators including comfort with social interactions and attitudes towards the 
targeted group to lead some individuals to speak up more than others. To measure these two 
individual motivators, I rely on a measure of extraversion and a feeling thermometer that gauges 
attitudes towards homosexuals, respectively. 
 
Design 
 This analysis relies on evidence from four separate survey experiments. In the following 
four sections, I will present results from these experiments that vary with respect to situation, 
target group, and (in one case) the type of sample. Initially, the experiment focused on a gay 
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target specifically, but concerns about representativeness led me to examine additional target 
groups, including the mentally handicapped and racial minorities. Furthermore, the first three 
studies all rely on student samples. To address concerns about generalizability, I also replicated 
one of the experiments using a sample gathered on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
 To understand when individuals will speak up for tolerance, I rely on a third-person 
hypothetical scenario. Essentially, I ask respondents in a student sample to imagine a student, 
much like themselves, in a classroom setting where other students were making jokes at a 
minority group’s expense. The third-person design is ideal because it enables individuals to 
imagine the social context without having to explicitly say they personally would fall prey to 
social pressure. In the scenarios, the gender of the character was matched to the gender of the 
survey respondent.  
 Using attitudes to predict behavior may fail because when respondents answer survey 
questions, it is often without imagining the social pressure we may feel when we are asked to act 
on them. To try and understand this difference, the first treatment in the experiment asks one 
group of students what they “should” do and one group what they “would” do. Responses to the 
“should” question ought to encourage individuals to consider what their attitudes would lead 
them to do. The “would” condition should make them consider the social context—those making 
the jokes and the others in the room. It should also encourage them to think about what the action 
will require of them, the fact that they will have to confront someone they will see again. 
Observed differences on the dependent variables between the “should” and “would” conditions 
will represent the effect of moving from abstract attitudes to situational behavior. 
 I chose gay men as the target group in this first experiment because expressed tolerance 
for LGBT populations is extremely high among the student sample. Thus, for most students, the 
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appropriate way to act on their attitudes would be to confront the students making the jokes. 
Furthermore, this is likely a situation that most students have encountered at one point or 
another, so they should have personal experience to draw upon; I am not asking them to imagine 
a foreign scenario.  
 The experiment includes one additional manipulation regarding group makeup. The 
vignette describes the reactions of the other students in the room. The vignette suggests that 
either other students are laughing or that most of the class is silent. This treatment is meant to 
challenge individuals to think about the reactions of others as participants make decisions about 
whether to act. I expect that laughter from other students will suggest a permissive norm and 
make it harder to intervene. I expect that silence from others should suggest that other students 
have experienced discomfort with the jokes; this could encourage the student to intervene, but it 
could also suggest unwillingness of others to help. Overall, I expect those in the Laugh/Would 
condition will be least likely to choose action and most likely to choose silence because these 
participants would perceive a social context amenable to intolerance. This should be followed by 
the Silent/Would condition.  I do not expect strong differences between the Laugh/Should and 
Silent/Should conditions because the “should” wording ought to lead individuals to imagine what 
should be done based on attitudes, regardless of social pressure. It is in the “would” condition 
where I expect social approval or disapproval to weigh on individuals. The experimental design 
is included below. 
Table 4.1. Jokes Experiment 2x2 Design 
 
 Others are Laughing Others are Silent 
Jenny/Joey Should do 25% 25% 
Jenny/Joey Would do 25% 25% 
 
The full treatment is as follows. Manipulations are included in bold: 
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[Jenny/Joey] is a college student at the University of Illinois. Last Wednesday afternoon, 
[Jenny/Joey] arrives to [her/his] class early and finds about a dozen of [her/his] 30 classmates 
already in the room. [Jenny/Joey] hears a couple of [her/his] classmates making gay jokes and 
impersonating flamboyant gay men. [Jenny/Joey] starts to listen, and realizes that [several other 
students are laughing/most of the other students are silent]. Again, imagine yourself in 
[Jenny’s/Joey’s] position, do you think [Jenny/Joey] [would/should]: 
 
Subjects could choose one of four options to respond to the scenario: Join in with the jokes; stay 
silent; leave the room, return when class begins; or point out that the jokes are offensive. The 
only response which requires overcoming social pressure is pointing out the offense.  It is also, 
theoretically, the only response that should advance the cause of tolerance.10 
 The survey was administered to a student sample in November of 2014. The sample 
contained 300 subjects (N=300). The four possible conditions had comparable numbers of 
respondents, as follows: Laughing/Would N=77; Laughing/Should N=79; Silent/Should N=69; 
Silent/Would N=75. The sample leans Democratic (65%), liberal (66%), white (67%), and 
female (55%).  
 
Results 
 The results of this first experiment suggest that people are more likely to be silent rather 
than act, even when they believe they should take action. Importantly, though, people did not all 
agree that acting was what should be done. Figure 1 shows the differences in actions chosen by 
condition.  Those in the Would condition are far more likely than those in the Should condition 
to choose silence, though a noteworthy portion of the Should condition also chooses silence. 
 The difference between the “should” and “would” conditions is most striking. Among 
individuals asked what “should” be done, nearly 60% said the person in the vignette should point 																																																								
10 Because respondents are given the option of leaving the room, one could argue that someone who is 
socially tolerant might do this to register their dismay. Although this is possible, responding to speech has 
the advantage of sending a clearer message of disapproval and providing a chance to mention the precise 
reasons for disagreeing with the jokes. 
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out the offense of the jokes. Among individuals asked what would be done, less than 30% 
expected the character to speak out. Also in the “would” condition, more than 60% of 
respondents thought the character in the vignette would remain silent and 7% even suggested the 
character would likely join in. When individuals were told others were laughing (indicating a 
consensus in favor of the jokes), they were slightly more likely to stay silent and slightly less 
likely to point it out. Figure 4.1 highlights the differences across conditions. 
Figure 4.1. Action Taken by Condition 
 
 n=10   n=19     n=117      n=158        n=10        n=19      n=117     n=158 
 
 Somewhat surprisingly, there is little difference between the groups based on the 
perceived consensus manipulation (Laughing/Silent). My expectation was that individuals would 
be more reticent to act when others were laughing than when others were silent. However, it 
appears that silence is the most favored response regardless of others’ reactions. Reflecting on 
the treatment, it may have been too subtle. It could be that others remaining silent simply leaves 
an unclear signal for the actor. The Silent treatment was meant to suggest a perceived consensus 
against the jokes, but stating that others looked upset might better convey this consensus.  
 Apart from the two main manipulations, there are also noticeable gender differences in 
the action taken, as shown in Figure 4.2. Women were more likely to say pointing out the offense 
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was what should be done and what would be done in the situation. More men thought silence 
was the choice the character ought to make (relative to the others) and 75% of men in the 
“would” condition chose silence. How can this difference be explained? One possibility is that it 
is specific to the target group—gay men. Perhaps men were much more reticent to speak out for 
fear they would be implicated.11 Perhaps, too, confronting another person about a minority 
group’s rights is more in line with something women do rather than men. Or, perhaps men 
worried that responding to speech might be more likely to escalate the situation. Whatever the 
reasons for men’s silence, these differences are interesting and important. Women are more 
likely to say they should and would speak up in this context, which is quite different from many 
gender differences discovered in other group interactions, where women (rather than men) are 
more likely to remain silent (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). 
Figure 4.2. Action Choice by Gender 
Women                                                                       Men 
 
 Would                                 Should                              Would                         Should 
n=155                    n=149         n=155    n=149  
 
																																																								
11 Although this seems plausible, it may be less of a concern than originally thought. It appears in other 
cases as the next section will suggest. 
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 One of the clearest expectations for this experiment was that individuals who expressed 
tolerance in abstraction would indicate that they would not act on this tolerance in a potentially 
confrontational situation. In fact, this is what many of the figures above illustrate. A few months 
before taking this survey, subjects answered other questions that provide insight into these 
patterns. When asked how much subjects like homosexuals, 88% of respondents score a 6 or 
higher on an 11 point scale, meaning they feel more positive than neutral towards homosexuals. 
Moreover, 85% of respondents believe same sex marriage should be allowed. This likely 
suggests that student’s attitudinal tolerance of gays and lesbians is similarly high in the survey 
population. However, only 38% of subjects suggest that Joey/Jenny will point out the offense, 
and this is heavily inflated by what Joey/Jenny should do. In the “would” condition, subjects 
suggest Jenny or Joey would point out the offense only 23% of the time. Thus, it may be unwise 
to assume that individuals who are tolerant will contribute to tolerant outcomes. To account for 
the difference between attitudes and action, we must consider the social context.  
 Finally, I examined a number of individual motivations that might make an individual 
likely to take action. This provides (1) some way of understanding what leads some and not 
others to choose to point out the offense and (2) a check on the hypothetical scenario.  If 
individual traits are unrelated to their choices, then perhaps individuals are not imagining 
themselves in these scenarios. For instance, if a conservative, introverted individual was more 
likely to say a character would point out the offense than a liberal, extraverted individual, this 
might raise doubts about whether respondents are really putting themselves in the position of the 
character. However, if traits predict action in reasonable ways (e.g. individuals who are 
comfortable with social interaction are more likely to speak up), it lends credibility to the 
vignettes.  So, what encourages a person to say that the character in the vignette would/should 
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take action?  
 I expected that particular individual differences may account for a participant’s 
propensity to point out the offensiveness of the jokes.12 A liberal female, comfortable with social 
interaction, who feels warmly towards gays ought to be the most likely to choose “speaking up” 
as the course of action for Jenny/Joey.  To measure an individual’s comfort with social 
interaction, I rely on a measure of extraversion, a personality trait that has been found to aid in 
the development of friendships and increase involvement in socially-demanding political 
activities (Jensen-Campbell et al. 2002; Mondak 2010). Extraversion was constructed from a 3-
item measure and ranges from 0 to 1 (mean=0.56;sd=0.23).  Ideology was measured on a 
traditional 7-point scale, where a score of 7 indicates a respondent is “very conservative” 
(mean=3.17; sd=1.54). Finally, I include a measure of attitudes towards gays and lesbians, a 
feeling thermometer question that asked individuals to rate their feelings towards 
“Homosexuals” from 0 to 100. This item was rescaled from 0 to 1 (mean=.71; sd=.26). I expect 
those with more favorable attitudes towards gays to be more likely to speak up.  
 Table 4.2 presents a binomial logistic regression of whether individuals say that 
Jenny/Joey would/should choose to confront discrimination (where 1 indicates that the character 
“points out that the jokes are offensive” and 0 indicates silence, joining in, and leaving).  The 
baseline model demonstrates the patterns illustrated above; those asked what the character 
“would” do were significantly less likely to say the individual would speak up.  This pattern is 
even stronger when respondents learned others in the classroom were laughing.   
 																																																								
12 There may be additional covariates that can help explain which individuals choose to intervene. It may 
be that people who are not simply comfortable with social interaction, but more willing or able to 
overcome social conformity are among those most likely to confront those making jokes. Future research 
should explore this possibility. 	
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Table 4.2. What Motivates People to Speak Up? Overall Effects of Treatments and Controls  
Constant    0.08  -0.81   
     (.22)   (.80)   
Experimental Condition 
Others are Laughing/Would  -1.67*** -1.74***  
     (.38)   (.40)   
 
Others are Silent/Should  0.25  0.31   
     (.33)   (.35)   
 
Others are Silent/Would  -1.09** -1.11**  
     (.34)   (.36)   
Individual Differences 
Extraversion      1.18+     
        (.61)     
 
Male       -0.47+     
        (.29)     
 
Ideology      -0.23*     
        (.10)     
 
Homosexuals FT     1.27* 
        (.63) 
 
AIC     368.2  347.08    
 
N     299  299   
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: +p<.1; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001 
 
 The second column in Table 4.2 includes the additional individual differences expected 
to influence the choice to speak up. All coefficients move in the expected directions.  Those who 
were extraverted and those who expressed positive feelings towards homosexuals were more 
likely to say the vignette character would/should speak up.  Also as anticipated, men and 
ideological conservatives were less likely to suggest the character should/would point out the 
offensiveness of the jokes.  The fact that these individual traits correspond to the choices subjects 
make about the characters lend further credence to the fact that their choices are reflecting ones 
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they themselves should/would make in a similar situation. Furthermore, the fact that the addition 
of individual differences does not alter the effects of the treatments suggests that social context is 
an important and independent influence.   
 Based on these results, and in particular respondents’ unwillingness to stand up for social 
tolerance, we can feel confident that the results from the previous chapter were not driven by a 
principled stance against prejudice, at least not one likely to manifest in behavior. Instead, it 
seems more likely that individuals simply avoid expressing their opinions on tolerance attitudes 
rather than experience social discomfort.  
 
What about other groups? 
 The difference between individuals’ normative preferences (should) and expected reality 
(would), suggests that tolerance might be in a precarious state. However, legitimate questions 
remain about whether this sort of finding is specific to this group—gays—and this context—a 
classroom setting. To address concerns about the group, I conducted a second experiment. I 
again drew upon a student convenience sample and the scenario that subjects read was the same, 
except rather than telling gay jokes and impersonating gay men, this time subjects were told that 
the group was telling “retard” jokes and impersonating the mentally challenged. This vignette 
allows me to assess whether the initial results were specific to gays or whether the experimental 
treatments and individual differences that mattered in the gay jokes experiment matter here as 
well. Additionally, this vignette makes the target of the jokes a group that does not specifically 
relate to a partisan ideology. Although liberals may be uniquely tolerant of gays because of their 
political preferences, there is no similar partisan split for the mentally challenged.  
 Before turning to the results of this experiment, two changes to the experimental design 
are worth noting. First, the laughing/silent condition prime was strengthened; subjects read that 
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others were laughing or looking uncomfortable. Because silence may be ambiguous, I wanted to 
be sure that subjects were understanding a perceived norm against the jokes among the others 
present in the vignette. Additionally, the optimal choice in the previous experiment was to “point 
out that the jokes are offensive.”  This wording did not adequately convey the sort of 
conversation that might be most helpful. Pointing out could take the form of something 
constructive and reasoned or simply telling the students to shut up. To compensate for that 
shortfall, this experiment offers five options—join in with the jokes, stay silent, leave the room, 
tell the students to shut up, or explain why the joke is offensive. Again, this final category best 
represents responding to speech.  
 Figure 4.3 demonstrates very similar patterns to the previous experiment. Although 
nearly 60% indicate that the character should explain the offense, in the “would” condition only 
around 20% indicate they would respond to speech. This confirms the sharp difference between 
the “should” and “would” conditions and again indicates reason for concern when it comes to 
standing up for others.  
 
Figure 4.3. Mentally Challenged Jokes Experiment 
Action Choice by Would/Should Conditions 
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 Looking to the second treatment shown in Figure 4.4, the stronger treatment seemed to 
make a difference. In the “uncomfortable” condition, the modal response was to explain why 
they disagreed with the jokes. When others were laughing, nearly 50% chose to remain silent. 
This suggests that social approval of prejudice make conversations particularly unlikely. This 
also highlights the importance of a clear consensus for individuals to decide how they will act. 
 




 Furthermore, splitting the sample by gender corroborates the results from the previous 
experiment. This is important because it emphasizes that the gender effect uncovered in the 
previous experiment was not exclusive to the gay target group. Figure 4.5 demonstrates that 
women are much more likely than men both to believe the character should speak up and that the 
character would speak up in the situation. However, for both men and women the modal 
response in the “would” condition is to remain silent. 
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Figure 4.5. Mentally Challenged Jokes Experiment: Action Choice by Gender 
 
 N=109              N=111 
Note. The figure for women has only four bars because no women chose join in with the jokes as 
something the character should or would do. A few male respondents did choose this option. 
 
 
 Finally, Table 4.3 demonstrates the influence of individual differences on choosing to 
speak up for others. Although the would conditions clearly make choosing to engage in 
discussion less likely, a number of individual differences matter as well. Again, just as in the gay 
jokes vignette, scoring high on a measure of extraversion makes individuals more likely to 
choose “explain” as the response. Outgoing people might be particularly helpful in these 
situations where it is a challenge to speak up. Additionally, there was no proxy for the 
homosexuals feeling thermometer for this experiment. Instead, to tap into their general attitudes 
about the group and situation, I include a measure of pro-equality attitudes. This scale is made up 
of six items, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86.13 These egalitarian attitudes also predict 
																																																								
13 The items ask respondents how much they agree or disagree with six statements—“ Our society should 
do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed”; ” We have 
gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country”; “One of the big problems in this country is that we 
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respondents’ choosing to explain why they disagree with the jokes. Attitudes matter, but context 
and other individual differences play a role as well. 
 
Table 4.3. What Motivates People to Speak Up against Jokes about the Mentally Challenged?  
 
     MC Jokes MC Jokes 
Constant    -0.04            -4.60** 
      (.27)  (1.51) 
Experimental Condition 
Others are Laughing/Would  -1.51***         -1.50** 
      (.41)  (.49) 
 
Others are Silent/Should  0.53  1.20* 
      (.40)  (.51) 
 
Others are Silent/Would  -1.20** -1.07* 
      (.41)  (.49) 
Individual Differences 
Extraversion      0.09** 
        (.03) 
 
Male       -0.56 
        (.37) 
 
Ideology      0.07 
        (.14) 
 
Pro-equality      0.12** 
        (.04) 
 
AIC     285.66  220.82  
 
N     242  200 
________________________________________________________________________ 




don't give everyone an equal chance”; “This country would be better off if we worried less about how 
equal people are”; “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than 
others”; “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems”. In 
the scale, all items have been recoded so that higher values indicate a value for equality. 
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 One other potential cause for concern with the previous experiments is the classroom 
context. It could be that the norms in a classroom make it an easier (or more difficult) place to 
speak up. Some may judge this context as a particularly inappropriate place to make offensive 
jokes or others may feel less comfortable confronting their classmates than they would 
acquaintances. For this reason, I chose to conduct a similar experiment using a vignette that takes 
place at a party. This allows individuals to imagine a less structured context, where conversation 
might be more comfortable. The vignette in this scenario is included below: 
 
[Jenny/Joey] is a college student at the University of Illinois. On Saturday, Jenny/Joey 
shows up to a party at her/his friend's house and finds a bunch of people already there. 
Jenny/Joey hears a couple of people she/he does not know making racist jokes and using 
racial slurs. As Jenny/Joey starts to listen, she/he realizes that the [other guests are 
laughing/	other guests look very uncomfortable]. Again, imagine yourself in Jenny’s 
position, what do you think Jenny would do?  
 
 
Unlike the previous experiments, there is no would/should condition. Instead, all respondents 
were asked how likely the character in the vignette would be to take the same five actions from 
the previous experiment. Then, they were asked how much they believed each of the five actions 
were what the character should do. In this vignette, an additional treatment was added as well to 
add another layer of verisimilitude. Alongside the vignette, individuals saw an image of people at 
a party. This is meant to help people envision themselves in the situation and it allows an 
opportunity for an additional manipulation. In one image (on the left), all of the individuals are 
clearly white, in the other image (on the right) an African American woman is prominently 
featured. Importantly, all the individuals in the picture are the same. It simply happens that the 
African American woman is obscured in the first image. The images are included below in 
Figure 4.6. 
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 These images were included to examine the impact of racial context on individual 
behavior. When members of minority groups confront prejudice, they are more likely to be met 
with a backlash from those expressing prejudice (Rasinski and Czopp 2010). For this reason, 
allies willingness to speak up against prejudice is especially important. However, a member of a 
racial majority group may take the silence of minority group members as an indication of tacit 
approval (Shelton and Richeson 2005).  These images evoke racial context in order to understand 
whether the presence of someone personally affected by the joke will influence the actions that 
individuals choose to take. 
Figure 4.6. Images Used in Racial Jokes Experiment 
 
 
 Because individuals often interact within enclaves, it is important to know how diversity 
changes behavior. It is just as important for an individual to speak up among other white people 
and not only when a member of a minority group is present. So this treatment is meant to help 
determine how racial context matters for speaking up against racial intolerance. The full 
experiment was again a 2x2 design and this design is included below. 
Table 4.4. Racial Jokes Experiment 2x2 Design 
 
 Others are Laughing Others are Silent 
All White Photo 25% 25% 
Black Woman in Photo 25% 25% 
 
	 78	
 Comparing what respondents thought the character should do across conditions shows 
that context does not seem to influence what subjects thought should be done. The means across 
the four conditions are nearly identical in Figure 7b.  Looking between Figure 4.7a and 4.7b, it is 
once again clear that despite the agreement about what should be done, few individuals believe 
that Jenny or Joey would act (Figure 4.7a). Additionally, this varies by condition. When subjects 
saw an African American woman at the party and were told that individuals seemed 
uncomfortable from the jokes, they expected the character to respond. In the three other 
conditions, they expected the character to respond at lower levels. In fact, individuals who saw 
the all-white image and read that others were laughing were among the least likely to respond. 
Again, this is despite the fact that these individuals still believe this is the right thing to do.  
  
Figure 4.7. Racist Jokes Experiment: 
Likelihood of Responding by Explaining Disagreement 
 
4.7(a)Would     4.7(b) Should
Note. Figures show means in each condition. The brackets around each point represent the 90% 
confidence interval around each mean.  
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These results again confirm the discrepancy between what people believe should be done and 
what people are actually likely to do. Furthermore, these results present new reasons for concern 
as they also demonstrate that individuals might be particularly unlikely to speak up for minority 
rights when surrounded by majorities. To leverage social pressure to help decrease prejudice, it is 
in precisely these types of situations (majority white), where individuals may have the best 
chance of explaining their positions and, potentially, converting others. 
 
Table 4.5. What Would People Do? Racial Context and Slurs 
     
     All White Photo Black Woman in Photo   
 
 Constant    0.25   1.87   
      (1.23)    (1.35)   
Context 
 Others are Laughing   -0.29   -0.72*  
      (.32)    (.30)   
Individual Differences 
 Extraversion    0.07*   0.02    
      (.03)    (.03)    
 
 Male     -0.72*   -0.27    
      (.32)    (.31)    
 
 Ideology    0.13   0.06    
      (.12)    (.14)    
 
 Pro-equality    0.09**   0.07+    
      (.03)   (.04)    
 
 Adj. R2    0.14   0.06    
 
 N     86   108   
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: +p<.1; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001 
 
 As with the previous experiments, I also examined how individual differences influenced 
respondents’ choices. Because there were strong interaction effects between context and 
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individual difference, Table 4.5 presents these results split between those who saw the all-white 
photo and those who saw the photo including the African American woman. The table presents 
the results of regressing individuals’ likelihood of taking action (their response to whether the 
character would explain why the jokes were wrong/offensive) on the laughing/uncomfortable 
condition and several individual differences.  
 As Table 4.5 demonstrates, whether others are laughing only seems to matter for those 
who saw the photo that included a minority woman. If individuals see a minority potentially 
approving of the joke, they are less likely to act. If others are described as uncomfortable, 
however, the character is expected to act. For those exposed to the all-white photo, extraverts and 
those with egalitarian attitudes were more likely to say the character would respond, while men 
were less likely to suggest that the character would take action. For those who saw the image 
including the black woman, the only other difference that significantly predicted a willingness to 
take action was possessing egalitarian attitudes. This table highlights the importance of racial 
context for action and once again emphasizes the fact that individuals and contexts must be 
studied simultaneously. 
 
Is there something unique about students? 
 Legitimate questions might be asked about the generalizability of a college student 
convenience sample. Although the student convenience samples employed in my analysis do 
limit the generalizability of these results, there are also reasons to think that younger people may 
be a particularly important age group to examine. Henry and Sears (2009) find that prejudices (in 
their case symbolic racism) crystallize across the lifespan. Because attitudes developed early in 
life may crystallize from early adulthood until late adulthood, there is reason to believe that 
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speaking up can pay dividends into the future. 
 However, to allay some concerns about generalizability, I also conducted an experiment 
on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT is a crowdsourcing service where workers 
anonymously complete tasks for payment. Although an AMT sample is still a convenience 
sample, the workers have been found to be more representative than most other convenience 
pools (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012) despite skewing younger and more liberal than the 
general public. In my sample of 864, respondents skewed young (mean=36), white (75%) and 
liberal (mean=3.3 out of 7), and were evenly split on gender. 
 This experiment draws on the race experiment above and respondents were again asked 
to imagine a party. The design is a 2x2x2 design maintaining the laugh/uncomfortable treatment 
and the black/all-white image treatment, but also adding back in the would/should condition. The 
Mechanical Turk version of the experiment used different images, with somewhat older party-
attendees (shown in Figure 4.8) to assure that most respondents would be able to imagine 
themselves at a similar party.14  
 
Figure 4.8. Images Used in Mechanical Turk Racial Jokes Experiment 
 
      
 
																																																								
14 It is also noteworthy that in the college sample, the visible racial minority in the group was a woman, 
and in the MTurk study, it is a man. Consistency between the two experiments would have been 
preferable and it is hard to know whether differences between the two experiments might be attributable 
to this gender difference. This possibility will be one I explore moving forward. 
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Results 
 To highlight the overall differences, Figure 4.9 presents mean differences and standard 
errors for each experimental condition. The figure shows some noticeable similarities to the 
previous studies—people are generally unwilling to choose action, particularly when respondents 
were asked what the character would do and when they were told that others were laughing. 
However, minimal differences were found in this experiment depending on the difference in 
racial context represented in the image. Additionally, further analysis revealed many similar 
patterns to those in the student samples with this larger non-student sample as well. Women were 
more likely than men to choose to speak up (p<0.05) although the differences were smaller than 
in the student sample. Again, those who spoke up were more likely to hold egalitarian attitudes 
(p<0.0001) and to be extraverted (p<0.05).  
 
 
Figure 4.9. Differences in Likelihood of Response, Across Conditions 
                                   
          n=431                   n=433 
 
















































Willingness to Confront by Condition, White Image
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character in the vignette should do. The bars in red represent respondents who received information that others 
looked uncomfortable, the blue that others were laughing. Finally, the figures include error bars around these mean 
difference 
 
 Once again, I dichotomized the response variable to whether individuals chose to speak 
out against the joke or not (coded 1 and 0, respectively) and ran a logistic regression including 
the treatments, controls, and an interaction between egalitarian attitudes and the would condition 
to understand how attitude expression varies by this condition. The full results of this regression 
can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 4.10. The interaction between egalitarian attitudes and what one would or should do 
 
 
    Note. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals 
 























Egalitarianism x Would Condition Interaction, All
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intervals. Although the differences between what one would and should do are negligible for 
those who score low in egalitarianism, the difference grows larger as individuals become more 
egalitarian. This means that those who hold the most egalitarian attitudes are most likely to 
identify speaking up as the thing one should do, but in the Would condition they appear just as 
unlikely as anyone else to take action. This is troubling, as we may hope that those individuals 
are best prepared to stand up for tolerance. Again, this finding points to the danger of assuming 
that holding tolerant attitudes will mean that individuals act on their tolerance.  
 
Conclusion 
 Maintaining a tolerant society, one that can preserve speech rights while combating hate 
speech, requires us to speak up on behalf of social tolerance once derogatory speech has 
emerged.  Despite the practical importance of tolerance, the results in this chapter suggest that 
social pressure can pose a serious challenge for individuals attempting to turn attitudes into 
action.  Individuals were unwilling to confront individuals making derogatory jokes and tell them 
why they disagreed. This finding highlights the deleterious silencing influence of social pressure. 
Thus, these findings also suggest that social scientists must take seriously the role of social 
pressure in everyday attitude expression.  At present, we have a weak understanding of how 
those around us shape our own willingness to express tolerance.  
 Although none would argue that tolerance attitudes are unimportant, I argue that they are 
insufficient to ensure a tolerant society.  Thus, we must consider additional ways to measure the 
weight social pressure exerts on us when we decide whether to speak up for others. This study 
suggests that both individual differences and social context can influence an individual’s 
decision to be silent or an advocate. Learning when individuals are inclined to be silent can help 
us understand how to overcome this impulse. Additionally, these results suggest that groups in 
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society that have not historically faced oppression (straight people, those without cognitive 
disabilities, whites) could do much more to serve as allies in everyday social interactions. 
Because members of marginalized groups can face backlash when they confront prejudice 
(Rasinski and Czopp 2010), it is important that others are prepared to act when prejudice 
emerges. 
 Although this chapter provides only a first step, it also aims to focus attention on how 
social processes influence interactions, like those deemed useful by advocates of participatory 
and deliberative democracy. Will people act to preserve minority rights in a socially complex 
reality? This chapter suggests that many may not. This is shown to be true for different target 
groups and different situations. The lessons here can provide deeper insight into what type of 




THE SOCIALLY DERIVED BENEFITS OF TOLERANCE 
 
 
“For First Amendment proponents, the answer to hate speech is not government censorship but 
more speech—counter-speech—that challenges the speaker as wrong and convinces the listeners, 
targeted or non-targeted, to disregard the message.” (Berrigan, 2002) 
 
 Are there really benefits to being tolerant? We often take for granted that  
tolerance will produce a societal good. Some theories suggest that tolerance can help us ascertain 
fundamental truths (Mill 1989; Milton 1886).  Others suggest that the freedom of thought and 
expression that thrives when we are tolerant can help us develop our autonomy and capacity as 
democratic citizens (Baker 1989). From tolerance, we should not only be able to understand the 
perspectives of others and give reasons to justify our own beliefs, but we should also see the 
value of encountering debates. We should be better for having seen a debate, both because we 
learned something from discussion and because we saw how discussions can serve as a solution 
to disagreement. Seeing someone else respond should give us faith that responding to speech can 
help us combat offensive ideas and seek out truth.  In this way, watching a debate should bolster 
our belief that banning speech or expression is not necessary. Instead, interpersonal persuasion 
offers the buffer we need against offensive ideas. In addition to these benefits to the tolerant 
individual, scholars suggest that there are worthwhile bystander effects.  
 
“I acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the 
freest discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbated thereby; the truth which ought 
to have been, but was not, seen, being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed 
by persons regarded as opponents. But it is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the 
calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary 




Mill expects that the exchange of ideas can provide knowledge and rationales even to those who 
do not participate.  Additionally, we might expect that watching these types of exchanges should 
help individuals appreciate speech. Those exposed to debate should feel more comfortable 
mirroring this behavior and confronting error with truth. This, in turn, should lead to more robust 
political discussion. In addition, observing others should highlight the importance of providing 
reason and evidence to justify our own views.  
 In this way, political tolerance is meant to prepare citizens for vigorous political debate 
and discussion. Throughout American history, as courts have reasserted free speech rights, 
justices often reiterate the crucial role of political discussion in American democracy. Justice 
Louis Brandeis, writing in a concurring opinion in Whitney v. California champions these goals. 
Of the Founders, he writes: 
 
“They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that, without free speech and 
assembly, discussion would be futile; that, with them, discussion affords ordinarily 
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest 
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty, and that 
this should be a fundamental principle of the American government” (1927). 
 
 
Importantly, this vision of free speech is not a free-for-all. As Brandeis seems to understand it, 
speech can be constrained in its ability to do damage. But speech should not be constrained by 
government, instead it should be constrained by other citizens. Citizens must develop the will 
and the skill to challenge “noxious doctrine.”  Brandeis dismisses the potential negative effects 
of “noxious doctrine,” precisely because he believes that discussion will negate its influence. If 
citizens will speak up, then discussion will provide the protection we need against hate speech or 
offensive speech by providing reason and evidence in return. This quotation suggests, again, why 
responding to speech is so important. Moreover, Brandeis clearly places tremendous value on 
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political discussion, calling it a political duty. His understanding of the Founders’ intentions 
suggests that freedom of speech is beneficial not as a way to bellow opinions into the abyss but 
to be met in conversation with other points of view. Tolerance is a means to prepare ourselves 
for and avail ourselves to opportunities for participation in the ‘political duty’ of political 
discussion. 
Despite broad agreement about potential benefits of tolerance and discussion, however, 
empirical evidence does not suggest that Mill’s or Brandeis’ optimism is warranted. It is easy to 
point to historical anecdotes where robust discussion was insufficient to counter ‘noxious 
doctrine’ in various forms. In times of fear or threat, intolerant voices can sometimes drown out 
tolerant voices. In fact, many early studies of social conformity, including Stanley Milgram’s 
influential work, were motivated precisely by this concern, that others may not speak up or 
intervene when a group was persecuted (Zimbardo 2006).  
Additionally, there are reasons to think that the supposed benefits of tolerance will be 
challenging to achieve.  Empirical evidence suggests that encountering debates does not occur 
very often and that we might be more likely to reject rather than learn from those with whom we 
disagree. Individuals are rarely exposed to those who differ from them in their social networks 
(Marsden 1987). Additionally, individuals tend to select media that is likely to reinforce their 
existing views (Stroud 2008, but see Mutz and Martin 2001). Even if they do receive this type of 
information, psychological research has demonstrated that individuals are often unwilling to 
accept arguments or information that conflicts with their pre-existing beliefs (Taber and Lodge 
2006).  
 Furthermore, the prevalence of misinformation among citizens suggests that it is not 
always simple for truth to win out (Kuklinski et al. 2000; Jerit and Barabas 2006), and in some 
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cases profoundly difficult (Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Cobb 2007).  Finally, the impulse to censor 
and suppress speech suggests that we might often feel that something truly negative can come of 
speech and that there is value to keeping erroneous speech out altogether.  Take, for example, 
recent controversies on college campuses about freedom of expression.15 The interest of some 
university systems and those who inhabit them in prohibiting various forms of speech suggests 
skepticism about these classic claims, skepticism about whether error will lose out to truth. To 
this point, this dissertation has taken for granted that political and legal theory suggesting that 
tolerance is beneficial is correct. However, there is little available evidence testing this assertion, 




Theorists argue that engaging in debate ought to lead to a host of positive outcomes. In 
this chapter, I focus on three ways that exposure to debates (the type of debates that occur when 
we are tolerant but also choose to speak back) should positively affect listeners—attitudes about 
a target group, expected participation in future debate, and free speech attitudes. First, those who 
lament hate speech and would wish to see it restricted often argue that it is because it can inflict 
harm by undermining the dignity or status of a group (Waldron 2012). Those who believe that 
speech should be confronted with more speech suggest that this process should negate that sort 
of attitudinal harm (Brandeis 1927). For this reason, it is important to understand whether 
witnessing confrontation can minimize the possible harm to a target group. If one person speaks 
intolerantly and another responds, does that negate potential harm? Second, those who promote 																																																								
15 “U. of California’s Proposed Statement on Intolerance Is Widely Found Intolerable,” “Students’ 
Requests for Trigger Warnings Grow More Varied,” and “For Our Free Speech, We Have Censors to 
Thank” represent just three of this month’s recent Chronicle of Higher Education headlines covering and 
challenging speech suppression on college campuses. See “The Coddling of the American Mind” for 
additional recent instances of censorship (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015). 
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deliberation and discussion often suggest that said discussion will help individuals develop their 
own capacities (Mill 1989). If this is the case, then witnessing discussion between others should 
help boost the ability and confidence of individuals to participate in political discussion in the 
future. Finally, those who are exposed to the type of debates Mill envisions, where at least one 
person is using reason and evidence, should be more likely to see the utility of such debates. A 
tacit assumption of Mill’s theory is that individuals will know when they see truth and error 
conflict that this discursive process can work to weed out truth from error. For this reason, 
individuals exposed to debate should develop an appreciation for political discussion. Moreover, 
they should understand the importance of freedom of speech even if it means that some offensive 
views may be aired. They should believe free speech to be worth the costs of potentially 
offensive or hateful speech. 
 My hypotheses proceed in two parts—the first (denoted as Ht) presents the ideal 
expectation based on normative theory. If free speech provides the benefits highlighted by 
political and legal theorists, what would this look like in practice? The second hypothesis 
(denoted as He) suggests expectations based on previously conducted empirical research. In 
providing these two competing hypotheses, I do not mean to suggest that those proposing the 
normative ideal would have overlooked the potential for real life to look quite different from this 
ideal. Nor do I mean to suggest that even among normative theorists there is no disagreement 
about how and whether freedom of speech will return benefits. However, because the ideal is 
essential in establishing the foundation for our free speech laws, the potential to meet that 
normative ideal is important. 
Normative theory suggests that tolerance provides many benefits to both those engaged 
with speech and to bystanders. In this chapter, I will focus on three potential benefits. First, 
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exposure to an exchange ought to lead truth to win out over noxious doctrine. Second, 
individuals exposed to an exchange should be better prepared and able to confront prejudice and 
error in their own daily lives. Third, individuals exposed to an exchange should hold a greater 
value for liberty and freedom of expression specifically. I will explore these three expectations in 
greater depth below.  
Mill writes, “wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts 
and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it” (p. 23).  This quote 
suggests how the benefits of tolerance are truly derived. Preventing offensive ideas from taking 
root requires reasoned discussion. Mill does not describe a simple rejection of ‘wrong opinions’ 
but talks about the importance of facts and arguments, which leads to my first hypothesis. 
 
H1t: Offensive speech can increase prejudice against the target group if speech is not met with a 
response. With a response, and particularly a reasoned response, exposure to speech will be more 
likely to decrease prejudice among bystanders. 
 
Unlike the normative ideal, research on prejudice does not suggest a populace so willing 
to yield to facts and arguments. Studies suggest that when prejudiced individuals learn that 
others hold similar prejudices, they are more likely to express their own prejudices (Sechrist and 
Stangor 2001). Furthermore, evidence suggests that emotional responses happen more quickly 
than conscious cognition and may limit the influence of reasoned argument (Taber and Lodge 
2006; Haidt 2006; Kahneman 2011). Finally, when false information is shared and discredited, 
social science researchers have found that beliefs from the previously learned information can 
persevere (Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Cobb 2007). These findings by social scientists lead to the 
following empirically-based hypothesis: 
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H1e: Offensive speech can increase prejudice against the target group, and that a response may 
have little effect on attitudes.  
 
Democratic theorists believe speech is how we develop our own abilities. When Mill 
describes how witnessing a change ought to work on the disinterested bystander, he is suggesting 
that the bystander’s mind may change. Witnessing an exchange helps provide individuals with 
new facts and arguments that they can bring to conversations. Additionally, Mill makes clear that 
one of the ways we develop our own abilities as democratic citizens and critical thinkers is by 
participating in these types of exchanges. Thus, those who witness exchanges should become 
more willing to participate in this type of democratic discussion themselves. 
 
H2t: On balance, hearing a response to speech (particularly a reasoned response) will increase 
individuals’ willingness to respond to speech in the future.  
 
 The empirical literature suggests a similar prediction, though there are limited studies in 
this area. Some evidence suggests that when individuals are exposed to different sides of a 
debate, they become more willing to participate in diverse discussions in the future (Mutz 2006; 
Klar 2014). The empirical literature, however, does not suggest that hearing a reasoned response 
would make individuals more likely to speak up in the future. 
 
H2e: On balance, hearing a response to speech ought to increase individuals’ willingness to 
respond to speech in the future.  
 
According to normative theory, watching democratic discussion in practice should lend 
legitimacy to resolving disagreements through discussion. Witnessing any kind of deliberative 
exchange should give bystanders a better understanding of free speech and, thus, greater support 
for it.  “Most ambitiously, we might hope that a well-functioning system of free expression will 
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ultimately encourage a degree of public virtue and produce high levels of participation and 
genuine deliberation” (Sunstein 1993, p. 244). Sunstein highlights that the system of free 
expression is intended to reinforce those values and encourage engagement from the public. 
 
H3t: Watching a reasoned response to speech should increase support for free speech more 
generally.  
 
One of the reasons that individuals are dissatisfied with the political process and government 
actors is that people dislike witnessing conflict and compromise (Hibbing and Theiss Morse 
2002). For this reason, empirical research suggests that bystanders may grow more negative 
towards freedom of speech when watching this type of conflict in action.  
 
H3e: Watching a reasoned response to speech should decrease support for freedom of speech 
because individuals dislike witnessing conflict. 
 
Research Design 
 To test these hypotheses, I design a survey experiment to investigate whether these 
bystander effects discussed by political theorists exist by exposing survey respondents to an 
interaction where intolerance is voiced.  The experiment was fielded to a student convenience 
sample including 211 respondents. In this experiment, subjects listen to a conversation between 
two people. In total, there are four experimental conditions—three treatment conditions and a 
control condition.  
For this experiment, I chose Muslims as the target group for the intolerant speech. 
Muslims were chosen as the target group for several reasons. First, intolerance towards Muslims 
had recently been in the news after presidential candidate Ben Carson asserted that Muslims 
should be banned from the presidency. Second, Muslims tend to be a group towards which 
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intolerance is somewhat higher than in the general population, and there would be potential for 
students to buy into this intolerance. However, there are drawbacks to the choice of Muslims at 
well. In particular, the choice of a Muslim target group is not ideologically neutral. Although 
people on both sides of the political spectrum value freedom of religion, recent anti-Muslim 
sentiments have been voiced more often by those on the right. For this reason, the response to 
speech may be more palatable to liberals rather than conservatives. In the future, these results 
should be replicated using different target groups appropriate to each side of the ideological 
scale. 
The audio clip that the treated individuals are exposed to contains two individuals having 
a casual interaction and one speaking intolerantly. The statement from the first speaker was as 
follows: 
 
“You know, I heard somebody on the news saying that we shouldn’t have a Muslim president 
because we don’t know where their loyalties lie. I agree with that because so many Muslims 
seem to be anti-American.  All we have to do is look around to know that this is true.  In fact, I 
don’t think Muslims should be allowed in American politics at all. Its just not worth the risk. We 
can’t afford to be politically correct when the safety of our country is at stake.” 
  
 
Essentially, the speaker argues that Muslims should be banned from public office and political 
participation in the United States.  
 The experimental treatment takes the form of how the second person responds. In the first 
condition, after the first speaker states their view, the second speaker responds with a brush off, 
saying: “Oh, okay, whatever…” In the second condition, the second speaker condemns the 
speech but offers no reasons or justification in response, “I totally disagree with you and I think 
what you said is offensive. I think it’s absolutely wrong to ban Muslims from politics or from 
holding political office.” In the third treatment condition, meant to squarely approximate a 
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tolerant response (the type preferred, wished for, demanded by people like Mill), the second 
speaker again condemns the idea but does so with reason:  
 
“First of all, we don’t have a national religious creed, we don’t discriminate on the basis of 
religion.  We can’t ban someone from holding office based on religion because that would be a 
violation of their constitutional rights.  Second, its wrong to stereotype a group of people based 
on their religion. While we cant deny that there are radical Muslims, they do not represent most 
Muslims. We wouldn’t consider the Westboro Baptist Church, for instance, as representing all 
Christians. I have personally known many Muslims who are loyal Americans just like us. I think 
it’s absolutely wrong to ban them from politics or from holding political office.” 
 
 
This treatment is meant to most closely approximate what tolerance ought to lead to/look like, 
and expose people to potential flaws in the argument.16 Finally, in the control condition, subjects 
heard an exchange about school vouchers.17   
 After the treatment, individuals were asked about a number of potential outcomes. Most 
central to my analysis, individuals were asked to rate their feelings towards a variety of religious 
groups (including Muslims) on a feeling thermometer. Additionally, respondents were asked 
whether they supported a ban on Muslim Americans’ ability to hold elected office in the United 
States (essentially, whether they agree with the position of the first speaker in the vignette). Next, 
individuals were asked whether they would be likely to respond in a similar situation. Finally, I 
was also interested in respondents’ attitudes towards freedom of speech and hate speech.  
 Ideally, if theories about tolerance are correct and if I am correct in my understanding of 
the potential benefits of combating speech with speech, then the group exposed to both the hate 
speech and the reasoned response should look different from the other groups. Those individuals 																																																								
16 One potential concern with these treatments lies in the fact that the reasoned response is lengthier than 
the unreasoned response. This could potentially influence the results, but it seemed a necessary tradeoff. 
While the unreasoned response could have just repeated the moral wrong they perceived in the intolerant 
speech, this would likely have weakened the argument overall. The shorter unreasoned argument is likely 
somewhat more persuasive than a longer version. 
17 This topic was chosen because it was not expected to have any clear relationship to the dependent 
variable of interests, attitudes towards Muslims and Muslim political participation. 
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should be more tolerant, more willing to engage with speech in the future, and more supportive 
of freedom of speech. By contrast, I expect that hateful speech not met with a response may 
cause more harm than good. That is, individuals should potentially be more willing to express 




 Before turning to the results, it is worth noting the real world contamination that may 
have occurred simultaneously while this survey experiment was in the field. Taking stock of 
events that occurred prior to treatment may provide important information about how to interpret 
experimental results (Gaines et al. 2007). The experiment was designed in early October,18 but it 
was fielded from November 16 to November 18. This means that right before the survey went 
into the field the coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris, France were in the news. Although the 
potential influence of this real world contamination is somewhat ambiguous, it is likely the case 
that it simply added an additional level of threat (which the Paris attack likely engendered). 
Heightened threat perception has been shown to increase levels of political intolerance (Davis 
and Silver 2004; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006), so the natural expectation might be that 
people will be more likely to express political intolerance or prejudice towards Muslims than in a 




18 The content of the vignette was inspired by Ben Carson’s September 2015 comments on cable news. 
On Meet the Press, Carson said: “I would not advocate that we put a Muslim in charge of this nation. I 
absolutely would not agree with that” (Todd 2015). 
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Intolerance towards Muslims 
 To capture intolerance towards Muslims, I use two measures. First, I use a feeling 
thermometer measure, which simply asked individuals to rate their warmth towards a number of 
religious groups, including Muslims. Respondents were asked to rate a number of different 
religious groups on a feeling thermometer scale, including Muslims. This measure was used to 
tap into hostility or prejudice that individuals may have felt, particularly after exposure to the 
intolerant speech. Generally, respondents felt more warm than cold towards Muslims, but these 
scores were lower than those for other groups.  
The second measure asked respondents specifically whether Muslims should be banned 
from becoming president or holding other elected offices. Response options included “Yes”, 
“No”, or “Maybe.” The vast majority of respondents chose no (87%) indicating that respondents 
did not allow hate speech to kowtow them into a position of political intolerance. However, there 
were small differences by condition. Table 5.1 includes the percentage of individuals who 
supported or opposed the ban broken out by the four separate experimental conditions—control, 
hearing no response, hearing a response without an explanation, and hearing a reasoned 
response. 
In particular, individuals appear to disclose less support for banning Muslims from public 
office when they heard a response to speech that condemned that speech but did not provide 
reasons why the speech was wrong. Perhaps when not phrased as an argument, but a moral 
position, respondents become more hesitant to be on the side of wrong or less likely to dig in and 
counter-argue against the second speaker.19  
																																																								
19 Another potential explanation for this backlash effect may have less to do with reason and more to do 
with treatment length. The reasoned argument is longer than the other treatments and this is a 
shortcoming of the design. It could be the case that the reasoned argument simply provided too much 
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Oppose Ban 83% 84% 94% 85% 
Maybe or Yes 17% 16% 6% 15% 
 
 
 Looking at these two measures together can provide additional insight about what 
respondents are considering when making these judgments. Figure 5.1 illustrates this relationship 
by presenting boxplots of those supportive or opposed to a ban within each experimental 
condition. Not surprisingly, those who supported (or considered supporting) a ban on Muslims 
running for political office all felt more coldly towards Muslims than those opposed to the ban. 
This difference, however appears to be somewhat amplified among those who were exposed to 
the Muslim hate speech. The control condition shows distributions that look more similar to each 
other. Moreover, those individuals in the reasoned response condition who supported or 
considered the Muslim ban expressed a distinctly cold feeling towards Muslims as a whole. This 
suggests a backlash among some respondents, who appear to feel more negative towards 
Muslims than those in the control condition.20 Although the number of students supporting a ban 
was very small, the fact that Figure 5.1 seems to suggest a possible backlash effect among those 
who heard the reasoned response may begin to show the limits of reason at encouraging 




ammunition allowing those who disagree more time to consider their disagreement. In future iterations of 
this study, I will strive to make the treatments more comparable so as to avoid this downfall. 
20 The same caveat about treatment similarity highlighted in footnote 19 applies here as well. 
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Figure 5.1. Muslim Feeling Thermometer Score by Condition and Support for Ban 
 
 
 Because the number of individuals supporting the ban was so small, I also examined a 
potential backlash effect among conservatives. The recent claims in the media about potentially 
banning Muslims from political office were voiced by conservative politicians, so I expected that 
the reasoned response might be more likely to be rejected by conservatives than liberals. Unlike 
those supporting an outright ban, there are a substantial number of conservatives in the sample 
(around 30% of the sample) providing enough variation to draw statistical inferences. To 
understand how the effects of the treatments varied by ideology, I run a regression that includes 
treatments, controls, and an interaction between treatment and ideology. Table 5.2 presents the 
results, which demonstrate a significant interaction between the reasoned response and ideology. 
In the control condition, conservatives rate Muslims more warmly than liberals. However, in the 
reasoned response condition (and also in the “No Response” condition although this effect does 
not quite reach statistical significance), there is a striking reversal. Specifically, conservatives 
who hear the reasoned response are more likely to report a lower rating on the Muslim feeling 

























thermometer towards Muslims. Liberals, by contrast are more likely to feel warmly towards 
Muslims after hearing the reasoned response. This interaction is shown graphically in Figure 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2. Predictors of Muslim Feeling Thermometer Score 
Intercept 37.36* 
(15.49) 
No Response 13.13 
(11.77) 
No Reason -9.72 
(11.72) 








Political Knowledge 15.18+ 
(9.13) 
Ideology x No Response -5.27+ 
(3.16) 
Ideology x No Reason 1.17 
(3.37) 






Note: +p<.1; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001 
 
 Figure 5.2 highlights that conservatives who hear no response or hear a reasoned 
response to intolerance become less likely to rate Muslims highly on the feeling thermometer. 
Liberals in these same two conditions become more likely to rate Muslims highly than they 
would in the control condition. This backlash effect, apparent particularly among those in the 
“Reasoned Response” condition, provides some credence to the empirical literature, which 
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demonstrates that people may reject facts or a reasoned argument if it conflicts with their prior 
beliefs.  
 
Figure 5.2. Warmth of Feeling towards Muslims, Treatment x Ideology Interaction 
 
 
In this way, my results suggest that listening to a reasoned exchange may not provide a buffer 
against prejudice among bystanders. In fact, exposure to hate speech, even when met with a 
response, may be detrimental to those exposed, at least in terms of their attitudes towards the 
target group. In this way, it appears that Waldron’s concerns about the harm in hate speech are 
reasonable (2012). However, examining additional influences can provide a fuller pictures as to 




























Ideology x Condition Interaction with Controls
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Willingness to Respond to Intolerance 
  
Exposure to free speech that promotes intolerance appears to be at least somewhat 
damaging to views about the target group. But is intolerant discourse and discussion entirely 
bad? Or, might there be a silver lining? One of the oft-mentioned linings is that witnessing an 
exchange—even over noxious views—ought to better prepare us to participate in these types of 
exchanges. Witnessing discussion should help boost our own rationales and understanding for 
our beliefs and should convince us that such engagement is worthwhile—building our own 
appetite for democratic deliberation. If this is the case, then those exposed to an exchange (and, 
particularly, those exposed to a reasoned response) ought to be more willing to say they, too, 
would speak up in response to hateful speech. To examine this possibility, I asked individuals 
whether they would respond with a different perspective if they heard someone saying members 
of a religious group should be banned from holding public office. I regressed this measure21 on 
their experimental treatment, their belief in their own ability to persuade, and individuals’ 
attitudes towards Muslims. The results are presented in Table 5.3 below. 
 First, it is worth noting that exposure to any of the three experimental treatment 
conditions appears to make individuals more willing to respond to speech than those in the 
control condition. However, hearing someone respond to speech does not appear uniquely 
motivating. Perhaps hearing intolerance at all simply reminds citizens that they ought to speak up 
for others, regardless of how that speech is met. 
Additionally, Table 5.3 reveals that other factors may be more important in individuals’ 
decisions about whether to respond to intolerance. The results show that feelings towards 																																																								
21 The precise wording was as follows: “If someone that you were speaking with said that a religious 
group should be banned from holding public office, how likely would you be to respond or provide a 
different perspective?” Respondents could choose from 7 options ranging from “Very Unlikely” to “Very 
Likely.”
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Muslims and individuals’ confidence in their own ability to persuade others are more significant 
predictors of willingness to respond than any of the experimental conditions. That highlights the 
importance of building individuals’ confidence in their own persuasive powers if we wish to see 
citizens who will confront intolerance in their daily lives.  
 
 




No Response 0.11* 
(0.04) 
No Reason 0.09+ 
(0.05) 
Reasoned Response 0.08+ 
(0.05) 
Confidence in Persuasion 0.51*** 
(0.10) 
Muslim Feeling Thermometer 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Adj. R2 0.22 
N 200 
        Note: +p<.1; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001 
 
Witnessing an exchange is theoretically supposed to be important because it allows 
individuals to witness others providing a response. It is supposed to help inform individuals of 
the rationales on either side. Perhaps, then, witnessing an exchange might have different effects 
on different people. In particular, if witnessing a response to intolerance provides information, 
then perhaps those with the most to gain might be those without a great deal of information. To 
examine this possibility, I ran another regression of willingness to respond on the treatment 
conditions, a few control variables and political knowledge. I included an interaction between 
political knowledge and the treatment conditions to see whether those without information were 
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more likely to say they would respond after witnessing (listening to) an exchange. The results are 
presented in Table 5.4 and graphically in Figure 5.3.  
 
Table 5.4. Willingness to Respond to Religious Intolerance by Condition, Controls, and 




No Response 0.41** 
(0.15) 
No Reason 0.31+ 
(0.16) 
Reasoned Response 0.49** 
(0.16) 
Confidence in Persuasion 0.55*** 
(0.10) 
Political Knowledge 0.48** 
(0.16) 








Knowledge x No Response -0.46* 
(0.21) 
Knowledge x No Reason -0.35 
(0.22) 




                   Note: +p<.1; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001 
 
In the abstract (when people have not heard an interaction between two people) or control 
condition, individuals’ willingness to respond differs depending on their level of political 
knowledge. Those with high levels of political knowledge express a greater willingness to 
respond to intolerance than those with low levels of political knowledge.  
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As Figure 5.3 shows, as we move from the lowest to highest level of political knowledge 
among the control group, their willingness to respond increases from about 0.4 to more than 0.8 
on a 0 to 1 scale. The ability of knowledge to increase intervention in interpersonal interactions 
may be heartening, but it is disappointing that those with lower levels of political knowledge are 
so much less willing to respond to intolerance. 
 




However, Table 5.4 and Figure 5.3 also show another noteworthy pattern. For those 
exposed to the offensive speech, knowledge is much less important in determining individuals’ 






















Political Knowledge x Conditi  Interaction with Controls
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were willing to respond at similar levels to the high knowledge participants in the control 
condition.  
 Although the differences between the conditions are quite small, it also appears that for 
those with the lowest levels of political knowledge, hearing a reasoned response to intolerant 
speech makes them especially likely to say they would respond to intolerance in the future. 
Despite the disheartening backlash revealed in the first part of this analysis, exposure to speech 
(and speech met by a response) does appear to make individuals more willing to participate in 
these types of exchanges. This finding provides some evidence to suggest that at least one of the 
hopes of democratic theory might be met by encouraging others to engage in debate even with 
those who express noxious views. 
 
Free Speech Attitudes 
 
Finally, does bearing witness to a confrontation over tolerance lead individuals to grow 
more supportive of freedom of speech? Or, does the conflict and expression of noxious views 
lead individuals to oppose freedom of speech after hearing an interaction? To examine the third 
set of hypotheses, I constructed a scale of support for freedom of speech.22 I regressed this 
measure on the conditions as well as the control variables from the previous model, including 
confidence in one’s persuasive abilities, egalitarianism, gender, political knowledge, and 
ideology. Table 5.5 shows the results from the regression model.  
 
																																																								
22 To measure freedom of speech, I included six items. For each item, respondents could choose to place 
themselves on a five-point scale ranging from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree.” The items were 
as follows: “A free exchange of ideas, even if hateful, is necessary in a free society”; “Hate speech 
intimidates and casts fears in the hearts of victims”; “Hate speech encourages discrimination against 
minority groups”; “Freedom of speech offers hope for changing attitudes”; “Censorship of speech leaves 
little room for debate and diverse points of view”; and, “Hate speech violates the civil rights of minority 
members.” These items were added together and range from 5 to 30.  
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Adjusted R2 0.15 0.15 
N 198 198 
         Note: +p<.1; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001 
 
The results in Table 5.5 suggest that listening to conflict does not decrease support for 
freedom of speech. In all three treatment conditions individuals became more supportive of free 
speech. Furthermore, those exposed to the reasoned response were the most supportive of free 
speech. In fact, the reasoned response condition is the only condition that reaches statistical 
significance at the .05 level. This finding suggests some support for the assertions laid out in 
political theory. Exposure to confrontation over intolerance appears to bolster individuals’ belief 
in freedom of speech. Additionally, some other noteworthy influences emerge in the model. 
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Women and those with stronger egalitarian preferences are less likely to support free speech 
attitudes and those with higher levels of political knowledge reported higher levels of support for 
freedom of speech. To test whether a similar knowledge effect existed for free speech attitudes, 
Table 5.5 also includes a model containing an interaction between knowledge and condition. 
However, I do not find any effects for a significant interaction.   
 
Conclusion 
On the whole, this analysis provides some support for the legal and political theory 
underlying our freedom of speech laws. But my analysis also demonstrates the limits of free 
speech. On one hand, individuals do seem to learn from listening to these debates. They learn to 
value freedom of speech and potentially feel capable of engaging in responses to intolerance 
even if they possess relatively minimal political information. This supports the theoretical 
expectations laid out in H2t and H3t.  On the other hand, the results regarding warmth towards 
Muslim populations suggest that exposure to hate speech can be damaging and that this damage 
is not reversed by hearing a response to speech. In fact, hearing a reasoned response to speech 
can actually make people feel more negatively towards the target group, at least among those 
predisposed to dislike the group. This finding suggests that the empirical predictions of H1e 
seem to be a closer reflection of reality than those discussed as ideal by theorists.  
So, does freedom of speech have the potential to do more harm than good or more good 
than harm? It is difficult to know from this evidence. This chapter has demonstrated some 
evidence on both sides. Additionally, the results are limited by the fact that this chapter explored 
only one case in a single-shot experiment. In the real world, people can be exposed repeatedly to 
intolerant speech and response and may be exposed repeatedly to one more than the other. The 
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potential for repeated and asymmetric exposure to influence individuals is worthy of future 
study. In this experiment, my ability to generalize is limited further by the student sample 
employed in this analysis. Moving forward, additional studies using representative samples 
investigating these effects among different groups and in response to multiple target groups will 
help provide a fuller assessment of the ability of free speech to live up to those democratic 
expectations. Based on this analysis, though, there do appear to be some clear benefits to 
freedom of speech. The question is whether those benefits outweigh the negative prejudicial 
costs of exposure to hate speech. The answer is in the hands of citizens.  The evidence says that 
costs can outweigh the benefits, but that this is not inevitable.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE TASK BEFORE US:  
TEACHING ACTIVE TOLERANCE AS A CIVIC OBLIGATION 
 
 
 Concerns about tolerance have a long history in our democracy and in political science 
scholarship.  These concerns have been with us so long that we sometimes lose sight of why we 
care about tolerance as a goal and why we think it is important to democracy. Tolerance is not 
solely an end in itself. Instead, it serves a means to create a discourse between diverse ideas and 
diverse citizens. Engaging in this discussion serves several purposes. First, it helps us reach good 
decisions informed by the interests of a diverse group of citizens. Second, it produces a 
democratic political culture that prioritizes reasoning together to reach good decisions and learn 
collectively. Third, it helps to create the kind of person that can maintain this democratic 
political culture.  
 So while tolerance is meant to lead us to discourse, it has become very uncommon  
to think about tolerance in this way. In fact, often we hear tolerance talked about as putting up 
with a disliked group. By this standard, letting others speak or live as they wish is sufficient, we 
can hold our noses or plug our ears but so long as others are allowed to speak and act as they 
wish, then we are tolerant.  But this conception of tolerance actually prevents us from deriving 
the benefits we can draw by confronting diverse opinions and responding with our own. It is by 
both letting ideas into the public square and being willing to engage with ideas we believe are 
wrong that we can most benefit from tolerance. Doing both requires an active citizenry, one 
willing to speak up on behalf of tolerance.   
 Yet decades of research have focused on attitudes to the exclusion of behavior (with 
several notable exceptions including Gibson 1987; Marcus et al. 1995; Abbarno 2013). Due to 
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the strong emphasis on attitudes, scholars have overlooked the challenges that arise when 
citizens attempt to act on their tolerant attitudes. 
 Pursuing active tolerance brings into view two unseen obstacles. Speaking up for 
tolerance requires individuals willing to engage in political conversation and, perhaps, political 
conflict. Thus, understanding who will speak up for tolerance means looking inwards towards 
our psychological tendencies and outward toward our social circumstances. We are limited by 
our own psychological tendencies, as those more comfortable with social interaction are more 
likely to feel comfortable advocating for tolerance among others. Furthermore, social norms and 
social expressions made by others may lead us to turn away from confronting someone 
expressing intolerance. Chapters 3 and 4 presented evidence demonstrating that social pressure 
prevents individuals from acting on their politically and socially tolerant attitudes. Although this 
is unfortunate news, my results also highlight that some individuals are up to the challenge of 
speaking out for tolerance.  
 Why do these findings matter? Chapter 5 presents evidence that if people are willing to 
go to bat for tolerance, bystander attitudes may change for the better. While encountering 
intolerance can make some individuals feel more negatively towards the target group, there are 
apparent benefits to tolerance—both in terms of sharpening democratic values and increasing 
individuals’ willingness to engage in cross-cutting discussion that challenges intolerance. 
Although this chapter did not suggest that benefits are inevitable, it does appear that there are 





Unresolved questions and future research 
 While the results presented in the preceding chapters suggest real challenges to achieving 
a tolerant society, some limitations of my data suggest reason to collect additional evidence in 
the future. One limitation of the previous research is that the experimental data in Chapters 3 and 
5 rely entirely on student samples. Although student samples are common in experimental work 
and not an inherent problem for causal inference (Druckman and Kam 2011), acknowledging the 
limits of the sample is important. There has been more ink spilled about tolerance among college 
students in recent years than other groups. As recent controversies and scholarly work 
emphasize, college students may hold somewhat different understandings of tolerance than other 
respondents (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015; Chong 2006). This might suggest that college students 
are more politically intolerant. However, college students also have a unique amount of available 
time, civic skills, and interest in political activism (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; 
McAdam 1986; Crossley 2008). So, while they may be less likely to be tolerant, they may be 
more likely to act than their older or employed counterparts. For these reasons, college students 
are an important group to study in their own right. However, this could also mean that the 
findings in these chapters may not be representative of the broader population. Although college 
students provide an interesting sample, I plan to pursue additional replication studies that 
investigate whether the same patterns hold among non-student samples in the immediate future. 
 Another limitation of the experimental parts of the research, particularly in Chapters 3 
and 5, is the inclusion of only one target group. Although both groups were carefully chosen, 
there are reasons to question whether I would find the same effects using different target groups. 
This limitation does not diminish the findings for either chapter or experiment, but it does 
highlight the important consideration that political tolerance is often group-dependent and that 
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different groups can evoke different reactions and preferences for restriction of civil liberties 
(Sullivan et al. 1982; Marcus et al. 1995). To this end, I plan to pursue additional studies focused 
on different groups in the future. 
 There are also additional questions about the causal story that I have not yet addressed. In 
particular, I did not investigate how citizens think about their obligations to tolerance. I argued 
that passive tolerance is insufficient, but perhaps people are not willing to be more active 
because they believe that passive tolerance is sufficient. Do people believe that passive tolerance 
is their only obligation, and can this explain the difference between their attitudes and actions? 
Do people think that one tolerant person would be enough to calm the prejudices of the 
intolerant? Do the tolerant or intolerant differ in their perceptions about whether talking across 
lines of difference can effect attitude change? To explore this in the future, I will ask people to 
explain their choices in subsequent studies. Understanding individuals’ beliefs is important 
because it may suggest quite different solutions. If someone is already tolerant and knows they 
ought to speak up but cannot, this poses a more challenging problem than someone who could 
readily act if only they knew action was required.  
 
Convictions without courage? How we can promote active tolerance 
 Consequential political behavior happens not only at the voting booth but also in our 
everyday social interactions. It is in these interactions that average citizens possess the greatest 
influence. They can demonstrate what engaged citizenship looks like for others. They can help 
fellow citizens develop their political beliefs, including what they believe about other people. 
Citizens can contribute to political norms in their communities. They can uphold norms of 
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political and social tolerance and explain to others why these norms are worthwhile. However, 
they cannot do any of this if they are unprepared or unwilling to act. 
 As this project points out, we possess a relative blind spot when it comes to 
understanding how the people and perspectives around us shape our own willingness to express 
social and political tolerance. As the preceding chapters demonstrate, individuals are mostly 
unwilling to stand up for tolerance (even in cases where they possess tolerant attitudes). If 
individuals lack the courage of their convictions, this limits our ability to derive the oft-cited 
benefits of tolerance.  
  However, this should not suggest that we lose hope. There is little evidence to suggest 
that individuals cannot increase their willingness to speak up for tolerance. That said, 
encouraging this sort of behavior to comport with democratic goals means challenging existing 
conceptions of political behavior and civic duty.  Although it can become easy to focus on voting 
and the duties that go along with it (staying informed, convincing others to vote, etc.) as our 
primary obligation in democratic politics, this conception of behavior often lets us ignore other 
important activities. While everyone may not vote, everyone has many potential opportunities to 
influence the politics of their communities by speaking up on behalf of tolerance.  To prepare 
citizens for this work, individuals must be prepared not only to form and express opinions but 
also to converse with others, to listen to other perspectives, and to create something from these 
discussions. This project has pointed towards attributes and contexts that are likely to lead 
individuals to choose to speak rather than remain silent. Understanding how silence happens and 
how silence is perpetuated can also help us think about how to overcome it, and ways to 
encourage the silent to speak up. 
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 In some ways, the social and psychological challenges to achieving a tolerant society are 
overwhelming. People seem unwilling or unable to stand up for their attitudes when it counts. As 
Chapter 5 demonstrates, if individuals are unwilling to respond to intolerance, then the intolerant 
may successfully lower affect towards the target group. Moreover, the existence of a perceived 
tradeoff between social and political tolerance has allowed the socially intolerant to hide behind 
the façade of political tolerance, further hindering the tolerant from defending marginalized 
groups. The inevitable question becomes: how can we overcome this state of affairs to create a 
citizenry who understands and can advocate for both political and social tolerance? To this end, 
we must look outward to our institutions and inward to our own character.  
 Standing up for tolerance is an inherently personal challenge. But our environment also 
contributes to our ability to meet this challenge. Our institutions—both political and apolitical—
can play an important role in shaping personal character by creating the type of citizens who may 
more readily take on a personal challenge. To that end, public officials and the news media that 
cover them can demonstrate the type of character we wish to cultivate in citizens. The media can 
show cross-cutting discussions that exemplify the sort of conversations we should engage in with 
fellow citizens. Public officials can participate in these sorts of discussions within our democratic 
institutions thereby reminding people of the values and benefits of political and social tolerance.  
 But, these institutions can only do so much. In our current political moment, we no longer 
have common media and we do not have a media environment that prioritizes hearing the other 
side. To convince citizens to be actively tolerant, society must help give people an appetite for 
that type of information and for discussion.  This means looking to additional institutions, 
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specifically schools and local civic institutions.23 Civic education plays a crucial role for young 
people to cultivate and learn their civic obligations. Focusing this education on political 
discussion, everyday interactions that can build and maintain democratic values, and other forms 
of non-voting political participation, schools can prepare engaged democratic citizens. Learning 
to have tough conversations across lines of difference is one of the most consequential skills we 
can learn. More specifically, schools can prepare citizens who understand the value of 
democratic norms like tolerance and what it takes to maintain them. This training has proven 
effective for some even in developing democracies (Finkel 2000). Furthermore, learned tolerance 
can spillover to friends and acquaintances (Paluck 2011). In this way, schools can teach 
individuals what tolerance is for, as a means to build political communities and make decisions 
that reflect these communities. By practicing political discussion, students can learn to overcome 
social pressure. They can learn the importance of small-scale political courage by standing up for 
their beliefs in interpersonal interactions.  This, in turn, will help foster a political culture that 
reflects and appreciates democratic values.  
 On the whole, this dissertation has argued for an active concept of tolerance and 
demonstrated that while it is difficult to get people to stand up against intolerance, it is not 
impossible. We sit at the precipice of a concerning moment for tolerance. President Trump’s 
rejection of social and political tolerance suggest that elite discourse may not guide citizens 
towards tolerance. Instances of intolerance appear to be increasing, and there was a particular 
spike in these instances immediately after the election (Miller and Werner-Winslow 2016).  
Furthermore, the incoming president has demonstrated his own misunderstanding of political 
																																																								
23 Skills learned through these institutions can then be practiced in other environments where 
individuals are commonly exposed to heterogeneous opinion. The workplace may offer 
particularly fruitful avenues for adults to engage in this discussion (Mutz and Mondak 2006). 
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tolerance in theory and in practice. Since his election, he has suggested revoking the citizenship 
of those who would burn the flag and reaffirmed a commitment to register religious minorities 
(Savage 2016; Blake 2016).  
 What does active tolerance look like with a political leader with a poor understanding of 
both social and political tolerance? We cannot know for sure. But what is certain is that this state 
of affairs emphasizes the need for an active citizenry to maintain and affirm democratic values, 
particularly tolerance. The election served as a reminder of the continued existence of people 
wishing to deny rights to others. It also illustrated the willingness of many to accept those 
messages (or, at least, look the other way). In this way, the 2016 election highlighted that 
tolerance is never fully won. Citizens must be vigilant and continually work to preserve this key 
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Supplementary Information for Chapter 3 
 
Table A.1. Experimental Treatment Effects, All Respondents 
 Publish Anonymously Publish with Name Attend Forum 
 Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. 
Intercept 1.56 0.27*** -0.82 0.22*** 37.45 2.97*** 
Majority Tolerant -1.09 0.33** -0.13 0.31 -6.58 4.14 
Majority Intolerant -0.34 0.37 0.21 0.31 -1.77 4.32 
AIC/R2 329.34 364.03 0.01 
N 287 287 287 
Note: +p<.1; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Results for the first two models are coefficients from logistic 
regression models because the dependent variables are dichotomous. The third model is an OLS 
regression, where likelihood of forum attendance ranges from 0 to 100. 
 
 
Table A.2. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in GSS Models 
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Action Taken by Gender
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Table A.3. Logistic Regression Model of Speaking Out against Racist Jokes 
 
       
Constant    -0.65*   -1.78**   
       (.26)   (0.62)  
Context 
Others are Laughing   -0.63***  -0.70***   
       (.15)   (.15)   
   
Would      -0.45**  0.33 
        (.14)   (.47) 
 
Picture with Visible Minority  -0.10   -0.18 
       (.15)   (.15)  
Individual Diffs 
Egalitarianism    0.15**   0.16*   
   (.05)   (.08)  
 
Female       0.32*    
          (.15)    
   
Ideology       -0.03   
         (.05)    
     
Age        0.02** 
          (.01) 
 
Similar Experience      -0.18+ 
           (.10) 
 
Persuasion Efficacy      0.86*** 
          (.14) 
 
Black Discrimination      -0.20** 
        (.08) 
 
Would x Egalitarianism     -0.20* 
          (.10) 
 
AIC       1101.6   1045.7    
 
N       864   864 
________________________________________________________________________ 




Supplementary Information for Chapter 5 
 
 
Script for Survey Audio 
There are two versions of each of these in the survey—one where the male speaks first and one 
where the female speaks first.  
 
 
Scenario: No Response 
 
Person 1: You know, I heard somebody on the news saying that we shouldn’t have a Muslim 
president because we don’t know where their loyalties lie. I agree with that because so many 
Muslims seem to be anti-American.  All we have to do is look around to know that this is true.  
In fact, I don’t think Muslims should be allowed in American politics at all. Its just not worth the 
risk. We can’t afford to be politically correct when the safety of our country is at stake.  
 
Person 2: Oh, ok, whatever… 
 
 
Scenario: Response without reason 
 
Person 1: You know, I heard somebody on the news saying that we shouldn’t have a Muslim 
president because we don’t know where their loyalties lie. I agree with that because so many 
Muslims seem to be anti-American.  All we have to do is look around to know that this is true.  
In fact, I don’t think Muslims should be allowed in American politics at all. Its just not worth the 
risk. We can’t afford to be politically correct when the safety of our country is at stake. 
 
Person 2: I totally disagree with you and I think what you said is offensive. I think it’s absolutely 
wrong to ban Muslims from politics or from holding political office. 
 
 
Scenario: Response with reason 
 
Person 1: You know, I heard somebody on the news saying that we shouldn’t have a Muslim 
president because we don’t know where their loyalties lie. I agree with that because so many 
Muslims seem to be anti-American.  All we have to do is look around to know that this is true.  
In fact, I don’t think Muslims should be allowed in American politics at all. Its just not worth the 
risk. We can’t afford to be politically correct when the safety of our country is at stake. 
 
Person 2: First of all, we don’t have a national religious creed, we don’t discriminate on the basis 
of religion.  We can’t ban someone from holding office based on religion because that would be 
a violation of their constitutional rights.  Second, its wrong to stereotype a group of people based 
on their religion. While we cant deny that there are radical Muslims, they do not represent most 
Muslims. We wouldn’t consider the Westboro Baptist Church, for instance, as representing all 
	 131	
Christians. I have personally known many Muslims who are loyal Americans just like us. I think 





Person 1: On the topic of education, I’d like to know more about what you think about vouchers. 
 
Person 2: Vouchers, which provide public funds to parents who need help paying tuition for 
private or parochial schools, are necessary to help students move to productive environments 
where they can reach their full potential. Many students are trapped in schools without resources, 
in environments that discourage learning. We should not devote resources to failing schools and 
hope for improvement. It is not fair to parents to deny their child an opportunity for a high 
quality education when school vouchers could put them in an environment that will help them 
succeed. A child’s potential should not be limited by public schools. Instead, schools vouchers 
will incentivize improvement in all schools. 
 




Muslim Ban -9.40 
(9.19) 
No Response -2.10 
(5.26) 
No Reason -4.42 
(5.19) 
Reasoned Response 2.02 
(5.51) 
No Response x Muslim Ban -11.12 
(12.94) 
No Reason x Muslim Ban -8.80 
(17.50) 
Reasoned Response x Muslim Ban -43.72** 
(13.78) 
Adj. R2 0.12 
N 204 
Note: +p<.1; *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001 
 
 
